Yoga breathing

It will however be wrong to suppose that these monotheistic tendencies were gradually supplanting the polytheistic sacrifices. On the other hand, the complications of ritualism were gradually growing in their elaborate details. Read more »

creation of the world, demon, devotion, dignity, eternity, fulfilment, magical results, rituals, sacrifice, vedas, virtue

The fundamental idea which runs through the early Upanishads is that underlying the exterior world of change there is an unchangeable reality which is identical with that which underlies the essence in man (1). Read more »

brahman, fundamental idea, man and the universe, psychological functions, samhita, upanishads, visible objects, vital breath

It is important for the history of Samkhya philosophy that Caraka’s treatment of it, which so far as I know has never been dealt with in any of the modern studies of Samkhya, should be brought before the notice of the students of this philosophy. Read more »

akasa, atman, auditory sense, cognition, five elements, five senses, illuminations, karma, manas, pleasure pain, purusha, samkhya philosophy, sense of touch, visual sense

A word of explanation is necessary as regards my interpretation of the Samkhya-Yoga system. The Samkhya karika is the oldest Samkhya text on which we have commentaries by later writers. Read more »

commentaries, gunas, intelligence, reference to, sutras, upanishads, yoga system

The Samkhya philosophy as we have it now admits two principles, souls and prakriti, the root principle of matter. Souls are many, like the Jaina souls, but they are without parts and qualities. Read more »

ananda, bliss, brahman, consciousness, jiva, mental phenomena, samkhya philosophy, sense matter, vedanta

The first evolute of the prakriti is generated by a preponderance of the sattva (intelligence-stuff). This is indeed the earliest state from which all the rest of the world has sprung forth; and it is a state in which the stuff of sattva predominates. It thus holds within it the minds (buddhi) of all purushas which were lost in the prakriti during the pralaya. Read more »

buddhis, evolutions, existence, first transformation, intelligence, purusha, sattva, state of evolution

The word Yoga which was formerly used in Vedic literature in the sense of the restraint of the senses is used by Patanjali in his Yoga sutra in the sense of the partial or full restraint or steadying of the states of citta. Read more »

affliction, cognitive states, concentration, inner experience, mortal enemy, mukti, passions, patanjali, purpose of yoga, restraint, samsara, satisfactions, vedic literature, word yoga, yoga sutra

When the mind has become pure the chances of its being ruffled by external disturbances are greatly reduced. At such a stage the yogin takes a firm posture (asana) and fixes his mind on any object he chooses. It is, however, preferable that he should fix it on Ishvara, for in that case Ishvara being pleased removes many of the obstacles in his path, and it becomes easier for him to attain success. Read more »

ananda, asana, concentration, external disturbances, impressions, objective world, obstacles, purusha, remembrance, samadhi, true knowledge

It is very probable that the earliest beginnings of Nyaya are to be found in the disputations and debates amongst scholars trying to find out the right meanings of the Vedic texts for use in sacrifices and also in those disputations which took place between the adherents of different schools of thought trying to defeat one another. Read more »

buehler, compound words, kautilya, logic, scriptural knowledge, upanishads, vatsyayana, vedic accents, vedic texts, vidya

The Vaisheshika is so much associated with Nyaya by tradition that it seems at first sight quite unlikely that it could be supposed to represent an old school of Mimamsa, older than that represented in the Mimamsa sutras. But a closer inspection of the Vaisheshika sutras seems to confirm such a supposition in a very remarkable way. We have seen in the previous section that Caraka quotes a Vaisheshika sutra. Read more »

aphorisms, cognition, demerit, dharma, enumerated, gunas, samskara, sense qualities, sneha, supposition, universality

The Vaisheshika sutras begin with the ostensible purpose of explaining virtue (dharma) (I.i. 1) and dharma according to it is that by which prosperity (abhyudaya) and salvation (nihshreyasa) are attained. Then it goes on to say that the validity of the Vedas depends on the fact that it leads us to prosperity and salvation. Then it turns back to the second sutra and says that salvation comes as the result of real knowledge, produced by special excellence of dharma, of the characteristic features of the categories of substance (dravya), quality (guna), class concept (samdanya), particularity (vishesha), and inherence (samavayay) (1). Read more »

dharma, effect karma, guna, karma karma, material cause, odour, sutras, water fire

The Nyaya sutras begin with an enumeration of the sixteen subjects, viz. means of right knowledge (pramana), object of right knowledge (prameya), doubt (samshaya), purpose (prayojana), illustrative instances (drishtanta), accepted conclusions (siddhanta), premisses (avayava), argumentation (tarka), ascertainment (nirnaya), debates (vada), disputations (jalpa), destructive criticisms (vitanda), fallacy (hetvabhasa), quibble (chala), refutations (jati), points of opponent’s defeat (nigrahasthana), and hold that by a thorough knowledge of these the highest good (nihshreyasa), is attained. In the second sutra it is said that salvation (apavarga) is attained by the successive disappearance of false knowledge (mithyajnana), defects (dosha), endeavours (pravritti, birth (janma), and ultimately of sorrow (1). Read more »

apta, atman, body senses, chala, dosha, five senses, inference, jalpa, pain sorrow, perception, pleasure pain, right knowledge, self body, sense objects, tarka, testimony

When we compare the Nyaya sutras with the Vaisheshika sutras we find that in the former two or three differentstreams of purposes have met, whereas the latter is much more homogeneous. Read more »

authorities, caraka samhita, chala, debates, hindus, jalpa, logical categories, practical art, refutation, sanskrit literature, sutras

The manner in which knowledge originates is one of the most favourite topics of discussion in Indian philosophy. We have already seen that Samkhya-Yoga explained it by supposing that the buddhi (place of consciousness) assumed the form of the object of perception, and that the buddhi so transformed was then intelligized by the reflection of the pure intelligence or purusha. The Jains regarded the origin of any knowledge as being due to a withdrawal of a veil of karma which was covering the all-intelligence of the self. Read more »

cognition, collocation, indian philosophy, inference, intellectual elements, intelligence, linga, perception, physical elements, purusha

The naiyayikas admitted only the five cognitive senses which they believed to be composed of one or other of the five elements. These senses could each come in contact with the special characteristic of that element of which they were composed. Thus the ear could perceive sound, because sound was the attribute of akasha, of which the auditory sense, the ear, was made up. The eye could send forth rays to receive the colour, etc., of things. Thus the cognitive senses can only manifest their specific objects by going over to them and thereby coming in contact with them. The cognitive senses (vak, pani, pada, payu, and upastha) recognized in Samkhya as separate senses are not recognized here as such for the functions of these so-called senses are discharged by the general motor functions of the body. Read more »

akasha, auditory sense, cognition, cognitive, concrete experience, five elements, motor functions, perception, perceptual process, right knowledge, senses, vak

I have pointed out above that Nyaya divided perception into two classes as nirvikalpa (indeterminate) and savikalpa (determinate) according as it is an earlier or a later stage. Vacaspati says, that at the first stage perception reveals an object as a particular; the perception of an orange at this avikalpika or nirvikalpika stage gives us indeed all its colour, form, and also the universal of orangeness associated with it, but it does not reveal it in a subject-predicate relation as when I say “this is an orange.” Read more »

consciously, differentiation, notion, perception, subject and predicate, unification, universals

Mind according to Nyaya is regarded as a separate sense and can come in contact with pleasure, pain, desire, antipathy and will. The later Nyaya writers speak of three other kinds of contact of a transcendental nature called samanyalakshana, jnanalakshana and yogaja (miraculous). The contact samanyalakshana is that by virtue of which by coming in contact with a particular we are transcendentally (alaukika) in contact with all the particulars (in a general way) of which the corresponding universal may be predicated. Thus when I see smoke and through it my sense is in contact with the universal associated with smoke my visual sense is in transcendental contact with all smoke in general. Jnanalakshana contact is that by virtue of which we can associate the perceptions of other senses when perceiving by any one sense. Thus when we are looking at a piece of sandal wood our visual sense is in touch with its colour only, but still we perceive it to be fragrant without any direct contact of the object with the organ of smell. The sort of transcendental contact (alaukika sannikarsha) by virtue of which this is rendered possible is called jnanalakshana. But the knowledge acquired by these two contacts is not counted as perception (1). Read more »

desire, direct contact, jnana, perceptions, pleasures, pleasure pain, senses, virtue, visual sense

The problem of negation or non-existence (abhava) is of great interest in Indian philosophy. In this section we can describe its nature only from the point of view of perceptibility. Read more »

cognition, existence, indian philosophy, inference, intuition, manam, negation, notion, visual perception

It is probable that the Nyaya philosophy arose in an atmosphere of continued disputes and debates; as a consequence of this we find here many terms related to debates which we do not notice in any other system of Indian philosophy. These are tarka, nirnaya, vada, jalpa, vitanda, hetvabhasa, chala, jati and nigrahasthana. Read more »

atman, destructive criticism, indian philosophy, intangible, jalpa, real nature, tarka, tautology, vada

The doctrine of the self-validity of knowledge (svatah-pramanya) forms the cornerstone on which the whole structure of the Mimamsa philosophy is based. Validity means the certitude of truth. The Mimamsa philosophy asserts that all knowledge excepting the action of remembering (smriti) or memory is valid in itself, for it itself certifies its own truth, and neither depends on any other extraneous condition nor on any other knowledge for its validity. Read more »

infer, objective truth, perception, philosophy, representation, revelation, validity, visual contact

We have just said that knowledge arises by itself and that it could not have been generated by sense-contact. If this be so, the diversity of perceptions is however left unexplained. But in face of the Nyaya philosophy explaining all perceptions on the ground of diverse sense-contact the Mimamsa probably could not afford to remain silent on such an important point. Read more »

inference, notion, objective facts, perceptions, senses, validity, virtue

There are two kinds of perception in two stages, the first stage is called nirvikalpa (indeterminate) and the second savikalpa (determinate). The nirvikalpa perception of a thing is its perception at the first moment of the association of the senses and their objects. Read more »

buddhist view, cognition, consciousness, determinate, genus, individuality, percept, perception, senses

All knowledge involves the knower, the known object, and the knowledge at the same identical moment. All knowledge whether perceptual, inferential or of any other kind must necessarily reveal the self or the knower directly. Thus as in all knowledge the self is directly and immediately perceived, all knowledge may be regarded as perception from the point of view of self. Read more »

appearance, cognition, deep sleep, dharma, dreams, inferential, perception, perceptual, reference to, remembrance

The question however arises that if all apprehensions are valid, how are we to account for illusory perceptions which cannot be regarded as valid? The problem of illusory perception and its psychology is a very favourite topic of discussion in Indian philosophy. Read more »

conch shell, illusion, illusory appearance, indian philosophy, perception, piece of silver, psychology

Shabara says that when a certain fixed or permanent relation has been known to exist between two things, we can have the idea of one thing when the other one is perceived, and this kind of knowledge is called inference. Kumarila on the basis of this tries to show that inference is only possible when we notice that in a large number of cases two things (e.g. smoke and fire) subsist together in a third thing (e.g. kitchen, etc.) in some independent relation, i.e. when their coexistence does not depend upon any other eliminable condition or factor. Read more »

cause and effect, existence, infer, inference, rohini, smoke and fire

Analogy (upamana) is accepted by Mimamsa in a sense which is different from that in which Nyaya took it. The man who has seen a cow (go) goes to the forest and sees a wild ox (gavaya), and apprehends the similarity of the gavaya with the go, and then cognizes the similarity of the go (which is not within the limits of his perception then) with the gavaya. Read more »

analogy, cognition, doubt, existence, perception, psychological analysis, remembrance

Shabda or word is regarded as a separate means of proof by most of the recognized Indian systems of thought excepting the Jaina, Buddhist, Carvaka and Vaisheshika. A discussion on this topic however has but little philosophical value and I have therefore omitted to give any attention to it in connection with the Nyaya, and the Samkhya-Yoga systems. The validity and authority of the Vedas were acknowledged by all Hindu writers and they had wordy battles over it with the Buddhists who denied it. Read more »

carvaka, philosophical value, sutras, vedas

Mimamsa has to accept the existence of soul, for without it who would perform the Vedic commandments, and what would be the meaning of those Vedic texts which speak of men as performing sacrifices and going to Heaven thereby? The soul is thus regarded as something entirely distinct from the body, the sense organs, and buddhi; it is eternal, omnipresent, and many, one in each body. Prabhakara thinks that it is manifested to us in all cognitions. Indeed he makes this also a proof for the existence of self as a separate entity from the body, for had it not been so, why should we have the notion of self-persistence in all our cognitions–even in those where there is no perception of the body? Read more »

consciousness, existence, going to heaven, pleasure pain, sacrifices, sense organs, true reason, vedic texts

From what we have said before it will be easy to see that Mimamsa agrees in the main with Vaisheshika about the existence of the categories of things such as the five elements, the qualities, rupa, rasa, etc. Kumarila’s differences on the points of jati, samavaya, etc. and Prabhakara’s peculiarities have also been mentioned before. On some of these points it appears that Kumarila was influenced by Samkhya thought rather than by Nyaya. Samkhya and Vaisheshika are the only Hindu systems which have tried to construct a physics as a part of their metaphysics; other systems have generally followed them or have differed from them only on minor matters. The physics of Prabhakara and Kumarila have thus but little importance, as they agree in general with the Vaisheshika view. In fact they were justified in not laying any special stress on this part, because for the performance of sacrifices the common-sense view of Nyaya-Vaisheshika about the world was most suitable. Read more »

dharma, five elements, inference, injunctions, rasa, sacrifices, theory of knowledge, valid knowledge, veda

The Mimamsists held that everything that is said in the Vedas is to be interpreted as requiring us to perform particular kinds of action, or to desist from doing certain other kinds. This would mean that the Upanishads being a part of the Veda should also be interpreted as containing injunctions for the performance of certain kinds of actions. The description of Brahman in the Upanishads does not therefore represent a simple statement of the nature of Brahman, but it implies that the Brahman should be meditated upon as possessing the particular nature described there, i.e. Brahman should be meditated upon as being an entity which possesses a nature which is identical with our self; such a procedure would then lead to beneficial results to the man who so meditates. Shankara could not agree to such a view. For his main point was that the Upanishads revealed the highest truth as the Brahman. No meditation or worship or action of any kind was required; but one reached absolute wisdom and emancipation when the truth dawned on him that the Brahman or self was the ultimate reality. The teachings of the other parts of the Vedas, the karmakanda (those dealing with the injunctions relating to the performance of duties and actions), were intended for inferior types of aspirants, whereas the teachings of the Upanishads, the jnanakanda (those which declare the nature of ultimate truth and reality), were intended only for superior aspirants who had transcended the limits of sacrificial duties and actions, and who had no desire for any earthly blessing or for any heavenly joy. Read more »

bhagavadgita, brahman, heavenly joy, meditation, sacrifices, shankara, truth and reality, upanishads, veda, vedas

The main idea of the advaita (non-dualistic) Vedanta philosophy as taught by the Shankara school is this, that the ultimate and absolute truth is the self, which is one, though appearing as many in different individuals. The world also as apart from us the individuals has no reality and has no other truth to show than this self. All other events, mental or physical, are but passing appearances, while the only absolute and unchangeable truth underlying them all is the self. Read more »

absolute truth, advaita, akara, appearances, brahman, cognition, comprehension, duality, macrocosm, microcosm, objective truth, passions, preceptor, sensations, vedanta philosophy, world consciousness

The world-appearance is not however so illusory as the perception of silver in the conch-shell, for the latter type of worldly illusions is called pratibhasika, as they are contradicted by other later experiences, whereas the illusion of world-appearance is never contradicted in this worldly stage and is thus called vyavaharika (from vyavahara, practice, i.e. that on which is based all our practical movements). Read more »

appearance, brahman, consciousness, illusions, perception, right knowledge, sattva, true reality, vedanta

Ajnana defined as the indefinite which is neither positive nor negative is also directly experienced by us in such perceptions as “I do not know, or I do not know myself or anybody else,” or “I do not know what you say,” or more particularly “I had been sleeping so long happily and did not know anything.” Read more »

consciousness, entities, i do not know, negation, perception, vedanta

Pramana is the means that leads to right knowledge. If memory is intended to be excluded from the definition then pramana is to be defined as the means that leads to such right knowledge as has not already been acquired. Right knowledge (prama) in Vedanta is the knowledge of an object which has not been found contradicted (abadhitarthavishayajnanatva). Except when specially expressed otherwise, prama is generally considered as being excludent of memory and applies to previously unacquired (anadhigata) and uncontradicted knowledge (1). Read more »

memory, mental state, perception, previous moments, right knowledge, vedanta

The inner experiences of pleasure and pain also are generated by a false identification of antahkarana transformations as pleasure or pain with the self, by virtue of which are generated the perceptions, “I am happy,” or “I am sorry.” Read more »

antahkarana, false identification, inference, inner experiences, manifestation, perception, pleasure and pain, vedanta

We have already seen that the Mimamsists had asserted that all knowledge was true simply because it was knowledge (yatharthah sarve vivadaspadibhutah pratyayah pratyayatvat). Even illusions were explained by them as being non-perception of the distinction between the thing perceived (e.g. the conch-shell), and the thing remembered (e.g. silver). Read more »

illusions, perception, presence, vedanta

That eternal immutable existence which transcends the turiya and all other states is the unconditioned Absolute, the supreme Brahman or Para-brahman, without Prakriti (nishkala) or Her attributes (nir-guna), which, as being the inner self and knowing subject, can never be the object of cognition, and is to be apprehended only through yoga by the realization of the Self (atmajñana), which It is. For as it is said, “Spirit can alone know Spirit.” Being beyond mind, speech, and without name, the Brahman was called “Tat,” “That,” and then “Tat Sat,” “That which is.” For the sun, moon, and stars, and all visible things, what are they but a glimpse of light caught from “That” (Tat)? Read more »

ananda, brahma, chaitanya, glimpse of light, guna, human speech, kala, rupa, sarada, shakti, shiva, spirit, sun moon, supreme brahman

It cannot be said that current explanations give a clear understanding of this subject. Yet such is necessary, both as affording one of the chief keys to Indian philosophy and to the principles which govern Sadhana. The term guna is generally translated “quality,” a word which is only accepted for default of a better. For it must not be overlooked that the three guna (Sattva, rajas, and tamas), which are of Prakriti, constitute Her very substance. This being so, all Nature which issues from Her, the Maha-karana-svarupa, is called tri-gunatmaka, and is composed of the same guna in different states of relation to one another. The functions of sattva, rajas, and tamas are to reveal, to make active, and to suppress respectively. Rajas is the dynamic, as sattva and tamas are static principles. That is to say, sattva and tamas can neither reveal nor suppress without being first rendered active by rajas. These gunas work by mutual suppression. Read more »

animal creation, deva, divya, guna, indian philosophy, jiva, karana, maha, manifestation, principles, rajas, sadhana, sattva, stable equilibrium, suppression, tamas