It is hardly possible to attempt a history of Indian philosophy in the manner in which the histories of European philosophy have been written. Read more »
badarayana, divergent interpretations, doctrines, european philosophy, history of indian philosophy, oral instructions, principal systems, speculations, sutras, tides and currents, upanishads The main exposition of the system of Samkhya and Yoga in this section has been based on the Samkhya karika, the Samkhya sutras, and the Yoga sutras of Patanjali with their commentaries and sub-commentaries. The Samkhya karika (about 200 A.D.) was written by Ishvarakrishna. Read more »
commentaries, hindus, philosophical value, yoga philosophy, yoga sutras of patanjali Pancashikha speaks of the ultimate truth as being avyakta (a term applied in all Samkhya literature to prakriti) in the state of purusha (purusavasthamavyaktam). If man is the product of a mere combination of the different elements, then one may assume that all ceases with death. Read more »
annihilation, atman, existence, gunas, moksha, moral responsibility, purusha, renunciation The earliest descriptions of a Samkhya which agrees with Ishvarakrishna’s Samkhya (but with an addition of Ishvara) are to be found in Patanjali’s Yoga sutras and in the Mahabharata; but we are pretty certain that the Samkhya of Caraka we have sketched here was known to Patanjali, for in Yoga sutra I. 19 a reference is made to a view of Samkhya similar to this. Read more »
history of philosophy, kapila, mahabharata, oneness, patanjali, purusha, siddhis, upanishad, yoga sutra, yoga sutras A word of explanation is necessary as regards my interpretation of the Samkhya-Yoga system. The Samkhya karika is the oldest Samkhya text on which we have commentaries by later writers. Read more »
commentaries, gunas, intelligence, reference to, sutras, upanishads, yoga system The word yoga occurs in the rig-Veda in various senses such as yoking or harnessing, achieving the unachieved, connection, and the like. Read more »
asceticism, bhagavadgita, brihadaranyaka upanishad, highest power, middle path, panini, philosophical ideas, rig veda, sanskrit literature, vow of celibacy, word yoga, yuj We have now to meet the vexed question of the probable date of this famous Yoga author Patanjali. Weber had tried to connect him with Kapya Patamchala of Shatapatha Brahmana; in Katyayana’s Varttika we get the name Patanjali which is explained by later commentators as patantah anjalayah yasmai (for whom the hands are folded as a mark of reverence), but it is indeed difficult to come to any conclusion merely from the similarity of names (1). Read more »
commentators, grammarian, panini, patanjali, western scholars, yoga sutra The question again arises that though purusha is pure intelligence, the gunas are non-intelligent subtle substances, how can the latter come into touch with the former? Read more »
gunas, impurity, inference, intelligence, moral responsibility, purity, purusha, real person, reflection, sattva, self consciousness, transformations, virtue It has been said that buddhi and the internal objects have evolved in order to giving scope to the experience of the purusha. What is the process of this experience? Read more »
abstraction, consciousness, imagination, manas, perception, purusha, sattva, senses, sense data The word Yoga which was formerly used in Vedic literature in the sense of the restraint of the senses is used by Patanjali in his Yoga sutra in the sense of the partial or full restraint or steadying of the states of citta. Read more »
affliction, cognitive states, concentration, inner experience, mortal enemy, mukti, passions, patanjali, purpose of yoga, restraint, samsara, satisfactions, vedic literature, word yoga, yoga sutra When the mind has become pure the chances of its being ruffled by external disturbances are greatly reduced. At such a stage the yogin takes a firm posture (asana) and fixes his mind on any object he chooses. It is, however, preferable that he should fix it on Ishvara, for in that case Ishvara being pleased removes many of the obstacles in his path, and it becomes easier for him to attain success. Read more »
ananda, asana, concentration, external disturbances, impressions, objective world, obstacles, purusha, remembrance, samadhi, true knowledge It is very probable that the earliest beginnings of Nyaya are to be found in the disputations and debates amongst scholars trying to find out the right meanings of the Vedic texts for use in sacrifices and also in those disputations which took place between the adherents of different schools of thought trying to defeat one another. Read more »
buehler, compound words, kautilya, logic, scriptural knowledge, upanishads, vatsyayana, vedic accents, vedic texts, vidya It is difficult to ascertain definitely the date of the Vaisheshika sutras by Kanada, also called Aulukya the son of Uluka, though there is every reason to suppose it to be pre-Buddhistic. It appears from the Vayu purana that he was born in Prabhasa near Dvaraka, and was the disciple of Somasharma. The time of Prashastapada who wrote a bhashya (commentary) of the Vaisheshika sutras cannot also unfortunately be ascertained. Read more »
commentaries, disciple, dissertation, exposition, gautama, kanada, purana, radha, ravana, shaka, shankara, sutras, udayana, vatsyayana The manner in which knowledge originates is one of the most favourite topics of discussion in Indian philosophy. We have already seen that Samkhya-Yoga explained it by supposing that the buddhi (place of consciousness) assumed the form of the object of perception, and that the buddhi so transformed was then intelligized by the reflection of the pure intelligence or purusha. The Jains regarded the origin of any knowledge as being due to a withdrawal of a veil of karma which was covering the all-intelligence of the self. Read more »
cognition, collocation, indian philosophy, inference, intellectual elements, intelligence, linga, perception, physical elements, purusha The naiyayikas admitted only the five cognitive senses which they believed to be composed of one or other of the five elements. These senses could each come in contact with the special characteristic of that element of which they were composed. Thus the ear could perceive sound, because sound was the attribute of akasha, of which the auditory sense, the ear, was made up. The eye could send forth rays to receive the colour, etc., of things. Thus the cognitive senses can only manifest their specific objects by going over to them and thereby coming in contact with them. The cognitive senses (vak, pani, pada, payu, and upastha) recognized in Samkhya as separate senses are not recognized here as such for the functions of these so-called senses are discharged by the general motor functions of the body. Read more »
akasha, auditory sense, cognition, cognitive, concrete experience, five elements, motor functions, perception, perceptual process, right knowledge, senses, vak I have pointed out above that Nyaya divided perception into two classes as nirvikalpa (indeterminate) and savikalpa (determinate) according as it is an earlier or a later stage. Vacaspati says, that at the first stage perception reveals an object as a particular; the perception of an orange at this avikalpika or nirvikalpika stage gives us indeed all its colour, form, and also the universal of orangeness associated with it, but it does not reveal it in a subject-predicate relation as when I say “this is an orange.” Read more »
consciously, differentiation, notion, perception, subject and predicate, unification, universals It may not be out of place here to mention that in later Nyaya works great emphasis is laid on the necessity of getting ourselves assured that there was no such upadhi (condition) associated with the hetu on account of which the concomitance happened, but that the hetu was unconditionally associated with the sadhya in a relation of inseparable concomitance. Thus all fire does not produce smoke; fire must be associated with green wood in order to produce smoke. Green wood is thus the necessary condition (upadhi) without which, no smoke could be produced. It is on account of this condition that fire is associated with smoke; and so we cannot say that there is smoke because there is fire. But in the concomitance of smoke with fire there is no condition, and so in every case of smoke there is fire. In order to be assured of the validity of vyapti, it is necessary that we must be assured that there should be nothing associated with the hetu which conditioned the concomitance, and this must be settled by wide experience (bhuyodarshana). Read more »
inference, kanada, linga, necessary condition, opposition, smoke fire, validity, valid reason The third pramana, which is admitted by Nyaya and not by Vaisheshika, is upamana, and consists in associating a thing unknown before with its name by virtue of its similarity with some other known thing. Thus a man of the city who has never seen a wild ox (gavaya) goes to the forest, asks a forester - “what is gavaya?” and the forester replies - “oh, you do not know it, it is just like a cow”; after hearing this from the forester he travels on, and on seeing a gavaya and finding it to be similar to a cow he forms the opinion that this is a gavaya. This knowing an hitherto unknown thing by virtue of its similarity to a known thing is called upamana. Read more »
cow, inference, observation, perception, realists, right knowledge, testimony, validity, vedas, virtue, visual sense It is difficult to say how the sacrificial system of worship grew in India in the Brahmanas. This system once set up gradually began to develop into a net-work of elaborate rituals, the details of which were probably taken note of by the priests. As some generations passed and the sacrifices spread over larger tracts of India and grew up into more and more elaborate details, the old rules and regulations began to be collected probably as tradition had it, and this it seems gave rise to the smriti literature. Read more »
brahmanas, commentaries, enquiry, ganganatha jha, india, literature discussions, sacrifices, sacrificial rituals, sutras Shabda or word is regarded as a separate means of proof by most of the recognized Indian systems of thought excepting the Jaina, Buddhist, Carvaka and Vaisheshika. A discussion on this topic however has but little philosophical value and I have therefore omitted to give any attention to it in connection with the Nyaya, and the Samkhya-Yoga systems. The validity and authority of the Vedas were acknowledged by all Hindu writers and they had wordy battles over it with the Buddhists who denied it. Read more »
carvaka, philosophical value, sutras, vedas It is difficult to ascertain the time when the Brahma-sutras were written, but since they contain a refutation of almost all the other Indian systems, even of the Shunyavada Buddhism (of course according to Shankara’s interpretation), they cannot have been written very early. I think it may not be far from the truth in supposing that they were written some time in the second century B.C. Read more »
brahma sutras, govinda, madhava, mandukya upanishad, monistic, shankara, upanishads It is useless I think to attempt to bring out the meaning of the Vedanta thought as contained in the Brahma-sutras without making any reference to the commentary of Shankara or any other commentator. There is reason to believe that the Brahma-sutras were first commented upon by some Vaishnava writers who held some form of modified dualism. Read more »
brahma sutras, dualism, nagarjuna, philosophy, prajnaparamita, shankara, upanishads, vaishnava, vedanta Vedanta philosophy is the philosophy which claims to be the exposition of the philosophy taught in the Upanishads and summarized in the Brahma-sutras of Badarayana. The Upanishads form the last part of the Veda literature, and its philosophy is therefore also called sometimes the Uttara-Mimamsa or the Mimamsa (decision) of the later part of the Vedas as distinguished from the Mimamsa of the previous part of the Vedas and the Brahmanas as incorporated in the Purvamimamsa sutras of Jaimini. Read more »
brahmanas, brahma sutras, commentaries, hindu, ramanuja, shankara, upanishads, vedanta philosophy, vedas This ajnana rests on the pure cit or intelligence. This cit or Brahman is of the nature of pure illumination, but yet it is not opposed to the ajnana or the indefinite. The cit becomes opposed to the ajnana and destroys it only when it is reflected through the mental states (vritti). The ajnana thus rests on the pure cit and not on the cit as associated with such illusory impositions as go to produce the notion of ego “aham” or the individual soul. Read more »
aham, antahkarana, appearance, brahman, ego, illumination, intelligence, jiva, luminosity, madhava, manifestations The Vedanta philosophy looked at the constantly changing phenomena of the world-appearance and sought to discover the root whence proceeded the endless series of events and effects. The theory that effects were altogether new productions caused by the invariable unconditional and immediately preceding antecedents, as well as the theory that it was the cause which evolved and by its transformations produced the effect, are considered insufficient to explain the problem which the Vedanta had before it. Read more »
cause and effect, definition of cause and effect, manifestation, phenomena, transformations, vedanta philosophy Vedanta says that when a duly qualified man takes to the study of Vedanta and is instructed by the preceptor - “Thou art that (Brahman),” he attains the emancipating knowledge, and the world-appearance becomes for him false and illusory. Read more »
attainment, karma, right knowledge, selfish desires, vedanta, vedas, worldly enjoyments
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