The World
We have already seen that the universe has come out of Brahman, has its essence in Brahman, and will also return back to it. Read more »
gross elements, phenomenal world, primitive elements, prithivi, universe, upanishads gross elements, phenomenal world, primitive elements, prithivi, universe, upanishads The Theory of Causation
There was practically no systematic theory of causation in the Upanishads. Shankara, the later exponent of Vedanta philosophy, always tried to show that the Upanishads looked upon the cause as mere ground of change which though unchanged in itself in reality had only an appearance of suffering change. Read more »
brahman, causation, chandogya upanishad, fire water, material cause, samkhya, systematic theory, upanishads The Indian Systems of Philosophy
The Hindus classify the systems of philosophy into two classes, namely, the nastika and the astika. The nastika (na asti “it is not”) views are those which neither regard the Vedas as infallible nor try to establish their own validity on their authority. These are principally three in number, the Buddhist, Jaina and the Carvaka. The astika-mata or orthodox schools are six in number, Samkhya, Yoga, Vedanta, Mimamsa, Nyaya and Vaisheshika, generally known as the six systems (shaddarshana (1)). Read more »
atman, carvaka, kapila, liberation, metaphysical position, mystical practices, orthodox schools, patanjali, philosophy, vedas, vedic texts, yoga practices, yoga sutras, yoga system, yoga vedanta Doctrine of Soul
All the Indian systems except Buddhism admit the existence of a permanent entity variously called atman, purusha or jiva. Read more »
ananda, atman, bliss, consciousness, exact nature, existence, impurities, jiva, passion, purusha, summum bonum, unity, vedanta The Pessimistic Attitude towards the World and the Optimistic Faith in the end
Though the belief that the world is full of sorrow has not been equally prominently emphasized in all systems, yet it may be considered as being shared by all of them. It finds its strongest utterance in Samkhya, Yoga, and Buddhism. Read more »
dissatisfaction, greatness, life of sorrow, painful experiences, suicide, true knowledge, wise person, worldly experiences, world experiences The Kapila and the Patanjala Samkhya (Yoga)
The examination of the two ancient Nastika schools of Buddhism and Jainism of two different types ought to convince us that serious philosophical speculations were indulged in, in circles other than those of the Upanishad sages (1). Read more »
attainment, brahmanas, magical power, philosophical speculations, sacrifices, sages, upanishads, vedas, vedic The Germs of Samkhya in the Upanishads
It is indeed true that in the Upanishads there is a large number of texts that describe the ultimate reality as the Brahman, the infinite, knowledge, bliss, and speak of all else as mere changing forms and names. The word Brahman originally meant in the earliest Vedic literature, mantra, duly performed sacrifice, and also the power of sacrifice which could bring about the desired result (l). Read more »
brahman, infinite knowledge, monistic, power of sacrifice, shankara, stage of development, upanishads, vedanta, vedic literature, water fire, yoga philosophy Samkhya and Yoga Literature
The main exposition of the system of Samkhya and Yoga in this section has been based on the Samkhya karika, the Samkhya sutras, and the Yoga sutras of Patanjali with their commentaries and sub-commentaries. The Samkhya karika (about 200 A.D.) was written by Ishvarakrishna. Read more »
commentaries, hindus, philosophical value, yoga philosophy, yoga sutras of patanjali An Early School of Samkhya
It is important for the history of Samkhya philosophy that Caraka’s treatment of it, which so far as I know has never been dealt with in any of the modern studies of Samkhya, should be brought before the notice of the students of this philosophy. Read more »
akasa, atman, auditory sense, cognition, five elements, five senses, illuminations, karma, manas, pleasure pain, purusha, samkhya philosophy, sense of touch, visual sense Samkhya in Pancashikha, Caraka, Gunaratna and Mahabharata
Pancashikha speaks of the ultimate truth as being avyakta (a term applied in all Samkhya literature to prakriti) in the state of purusha (purusavasthamavyaktam). If man is the product of a mere combination of the different elements, then one may assume that all ceases with death. Read more »
annihilation, atman, existence, gunas, moksha, moral responsibility, purusha, renunciation Samkhya in Patanjali’s Yoga sutras
The earliest descriptions of a Samkhya which agrees with Ishvarakrishna’s Samkhya (but with an addition of Ishvara) are to be found in Patanjali’s Yoga sutras and in the Mahabharata; but we are pretty certain that the Samkhya of Caraka we have sketched here was known to Patanjali, for in Yoga sutra I. 19 a reference is made to a view of Samkhya similar to this. Read more »
history of philosophy, kapila, mahabharata, oneness, patanjali, purusha, siddhis, upanishad, yoga sutra, yoga sutras Samkhya karika, Samkhya sutra, Vacaspati Mishra and Vijnana Bhikshu
A word of explanation is necessary as regards my interpretation of the Samkhya-Yoga system. The Samkhya karika is the oldest Samkhya text on which we have commentaries by later writers. Read more »
commentaries, gunas, intelligence, reference to, sutras, upanishads, yoga system Yoga and Patanjali
The word yoga occurs in the rig-Veda in various senses such as yoking or harnessing, achieving the unachieved, connection, and the like. Read more »
asceticism, bhagavadgita, brihadaranyaka upanishad, highest power, middle path, panini, philosophical ideas, rig veda, sanskrit literature, vow of celibacy, word yoga, yuj Date of Patanjali
We have now to meet the vexed question of the probable date of this famous Yoga author Patanjali. Weber had tried to connect him with Kapya Patamchala of Shatapatha Brahmana; in Katyayana’s Varttika we get the name Patanjali which is explained by later commentators as patantah anjalayah yasmai (for whom the hands are folded as a mark of reverence), but it is indeed difficult to come to any conclusion merely from the similarity of names (1). Read more »
commentators, grammarian, panini, patanjali, western scholars, yoga sutra Conception of Yoga in the Maitrayana Upanishad
The conception of Yoga as we meet it in the Maitrayana Upanishad consisted of six angas or accessories, namely pranayama, pratyahara, dhyana, dharana, tarka and samadhi (1). Read more »
ahimsa, anga, asana, dhyana, karuna, niyama, patanjali, pranayama, samadhi, satya, sex control, tarka, upanishad, yoga sutras The Samkhya and the Yoga Doctrine of Soul or Purusha
The Samkhya philosophy as we have it now admits two principles, souls and prakriti, the root principle of matter. Souls are many, like the Jaina souls, but they are without parts and qualities. Read more »
ananda, bliss, brahman, consciousness, jiva, mental phenomena, samkhya philosophy, sense matter, vedanta Thought and Matter
A question naturally arises, that if the knowledge forms are made up of some sort of stuff as the objective forms of matter are, why then should the purusha illuminate it and not external material objects. Read more »
intelligence, mass energy, notions, purusha, reflection, sattva, transcendent Feelings, the Ultimate Substances
Another question that arises in this connection is the position of feeling in such an analysis of thought and matter. Samkhya holds that the three characteristic constituents that we have analyzed just now are feeling substances. Feeling is the most interesting side of our consciousness. Read more »
consciousness, evolution, feelings, forms of matter, genesis, intelligence, manifestations, mass energy, material objects, purusha, reflection, sattva, sensations, substances The Gunas
These three types of ultimate subtle entities are technically called guna in Samkhya philosophy (1). Read more »
abstract qualities, gunas, mental qualities, purusha, samkhya philosophy, sanskrit Prakriti and its Evolution
Samkhya believes that before this world came into being there was such a state of dissolution–a state in which the guna compounds had disintegrated into a state of disunion and had by their mutual opposition produced an equilibrium the prakriti. Read more »
Cosmic Evolution, gunas, manifestation, mutual opposition, phenomenal product, phenomenon, rajas, resistance, sattva, tendencies Pralaya and the disturbance of the Prakriti Equilibrium
But how or rather why prakriti should be disturbed is the most knotty point in Samkhya. It is postulated that the prakriti or the sum-total of the gunas is so connected with the purushas, and there is such an inherent teleology or blind purpose in the lifeless prakriti, that all its evolution and transformations tike place for the sake of the diverse purushas, to serve the enjoyment of pleasures and sufferance of pain through experiences, and finally leading them to absolute freedom or mukti. Read more »
absolute freedom, cessation, equilibrium, evolution, gunas, intense activity, mukti, mutual opposition, passive state, samsara The Tanmatras and the Paramanus
The other tendency, namely that of tamas, has to be helped by the liberated rajas of ahamkara, in order to make itself preponderant, and this state in which the tamas succeeds in overcoming the sattva side which was so preponderant in the buddhi, is called bhutadi (1). Read more »
emanation, gross elements, potentials, quantum, radiant heat, rajas, sattva, subtle matter, tamas, vibratory Principle of Causation and Conservation of Energy
The question is raised, how can the prakriti supply the deficiencies made in its evolutes by the formation of other evolutes from them? When from mahat some tanmatras have evolved, or when from the tanmatras some atoms have evolved, how can the deficiency in mahat and the tanmatras be made good by the prakriti? (1). Read more »
cause and effect, concomitant conditions, gross body, gunas, karana, latent powers, manifestation, material cause, potential energy, shakti, ultimate energy Change as the formation of new collocations
It is easy to see from what we have already said that any collocation of atoms forming a thing could not change its form, unless the barrier inherent or caused by the formation of the present collocation could be removed by some other extraneous instrumental cause. Read more »
energy flows, equilibrium, infinite objects, kashmere, natural barriers, tejas Causation as Satkaryavada (the theory that the effect potentially exists before it is generated by the movement of the cause)
The above consideration brings us to an important aspect of the Samkhya view of causation as satkaryavada. Samkhya holds that there can be no production of a thing previously non-existent; causation means the appearance or manifestation of a quality due to certain changes of collocations in the causes which were already held in them in a potential form. Read more »
atoms, buddhists, causation, continual change, dharma, manifestation, nihilists, non existent, reals Samkhya Atheism and Yoga Theism
Granted that the interchange of the positions of the infinite number of reals produce all the world and its transformations; whence comes this fixed order of the universe, the fixed order of cause and effect, the fixed order of the so-called barriers which prevent the transformation of any cause into any effect or the first disturbance of the equilibrium of the prakriti? Read more »
cause and effect, equilibrium, faculties, gunas, material objects, mental plane, order of the universe, samsara, subjective experiences, teleology, tendency Buddhi and Purusha
The question again arises that though purusha is pure intelligence, the gunas are non-intelligent subtle substances, how can the latter come into touch with the former? Read more »
gunas, impurity, inference, intelligence, moral responsibility, purity, purusha, real person, reflection, sattva, self consciousness, transformations, virtue The Cognitive Process and some characteristics of Citta
It has been said that buddhi and the internal objects have evolved in order to giving scope to the experience of the purusha. What is the process of this experience? Read more »
abstraction, consciousness, imagination, manas, perception, purusha, sattva, senses, sense data Sorrow and its Dissolution
Samkhya and the Yoga, like the Buddhists, hold that all experience is sorrowful. Tamas, we know, represents the pain substance. As tamas must be present in some degree in all combinations, all intellectual operations are fraught with some degree of painful feeling (1). Read more »
buddhists, happiness, mukti, pleasures, sacrifice, sacrifices, samkhya philosophy, sorrow, tamas, vedic, worldly experience Citta
The word Yoga which was formerly used in Vedic literature in the sense of the restraint of the senses is used by Patanjali in his Yoga sutra in the sense of the partial or full restraint or steadying of the states of citta. Read more »
affliction, cognitive states, concentration, inner experience, mortal enemy, mukti, passions, patanjali, purpose of yoga, restraint, samsara, satisfactions, vedic literature, word yoga, yoga sutra The Yoga Meditation
When the mind has become pure the chances of its being ruffled by external disturbances are greatly reduced. At such a stage the yogin takes a firm posture (asana) and fixes his mind on any object he chooses. It is, however, preferable that he should fix it on Ishvara, for in that case Ishvara being pleased removes many of the obstacles in his path, and it becomes easier for him to attain success. Read more »
ananda, asana, concentration, external disturbances, impressions, objective world, obstacles, purusha, remembrance, samadhi, true knowledge Criticism of Buddhism and Samkhya from the Nyaya standpoint
The Buddhists had upset all common sense convictions of substance and attribute, cause and effect, and permanence of things, on the ground that all collocations are momentary; each group of collocations exhausts itself in giving rise to another group and that to another and so on. Read more »
atoms, buddhists, cause and effect, common sense, corresponding elements, jug, manifestation, modus operandi, one moment, permanence Nyaya and Vaisheshika sutras
It is very probable that the earliest beginnings of Nyaya are to be found in the disputations and debates amongst scholars trying to find out the right meanings of the Vedic texts for use in sacrifices and also in those disputations which took place between the adherents of different schools of thought trying to defeat one another. Read more »
buehler, compound words, kautilya, logic, scriptural knowledge, upanishads, vatsyayana, vedic accents, vedic texts, vidya Does Vaisheshika represent an Old School of Mimamsa?
The Vaisheshika is so much associated with Nyaya by tradition that it seems at first sight quite unlikely that it could be supposed to represent an old school of Mimamsa, older than that represented in the Mimamsa sutras. But a closer inspection of the Vaisheshika sutras seems to confirm such a supposition in a very remarkable way. We have seen in the previous section that Caraka quotes a Vaisheshika sutra. Read more »
aphorisms, cognition, demerit, dharma, enumerated, gunas, samskara, sense qualities, sneha, supposition, universality Philosophy in the Vaisheshika sutras
The Vaisheshika sutras begin with the ostensible purpose of explaining virtue (dharma) (I.i. 1) and dharma according to it is that by which prosperity (abhyudaya) and salvation (nihshreyasa) are attained. Then it goes on to say that the validity of the Vedas depends on the fact that it leads us to prosperity and salvation. Then it turns back to the second sutra and says that salvation comes as the result of real knowledge, produced by special excellence of dharma, of the characteristic features of the categories of substance (dravya), quality (guna), class concept (samdanya), particularity (vishesha), and inherence (samavayay) (1). Read more »
dharma, effect karma, guna, karma karma, material cause, odour, sutras, water fire Philosophy in the Nyaya sutras
The Nyaya sutras begin with an enumeration of the sixteen subjects, viz. means of right knowledge (pramana), object of right knowledge (prameya), doubt (samshaya), purpose (prayojana), illustrative instances (drishtanta), accepted conclusions (siddhanta), premisses (avayava), argumentation (tarka), ascertainment (nirnaya), debates (vada), disputations (jalpa), destructive criticisms (vitanda), fallacy (hetvabhasa), quibble (chala), refutations (jati), points of opponent’s defeat (nigrahasthana), and hold that by a thorough knowledge of these the highest good (nihshreyasa), is attained. In the second sutra it is said that salvation (apavarga) is attained by the successive disappearance of false knowledge (mithyajnana), defects (dosha), endeavours (pravritti, birth (janma), and ultimately of sorrow (1). Read more »
apta, atman, body senses, chala, dosha, five senses, inference, jalpa, pain sorrow, perception, pleasure pain, right knowledge, self body, sense objects, tarka, testimony Caraka, Nyaya sutras and Vaisheshika sutras
When we compare the Nyaya sutras with the Vaisheshika sutras we find that in the former two or three differentstreams of purposes have met, whereas the latter is much more homogeneous. Read more »
authorities, caraka samhita, chala, debates, hindus, jalpa, logical categories, practical art, refutation, sanskrit literature, sutras The main doctrine of the Nyaya-Vaisheshika Philosophy
The Nyaya-Vaisheshika having dismissed the doctrine of momentariness took a common-sense view of things, and held that things remain permanent until suitable collocations so arrange themselves that the thing can be destroyed. Thus the jug continues to remain a jug unless or until it is broken to pieces by the stroke of a stick. Things exist not because they can produce an impression on us, or serve my purposes either directly or through knowledge, as the Buddhists suppose, but because existence is one of their characteristics. If I or you or any other perceiver did not exist, the things would continue to exist all the same. Whether they produce any effect on us or on their surrounding environments is immaterial. Existence is the most general characteristic of things, and it is on account of this that things are testified by experience to be existing (1). Read more »
akasha, cosmology, demerit, ear drum, existence, four elements, immaterial, kala, sense of hearing, sense organ, tejas, valid reasons The six Padarthas: Dravya, Guna, Karma, Samanya, Vishesha, Samavaya
Of the six classes of entities or categories (padartha) we have already given some account of dravya (1). Let us now turn to the others. Of the qualities (guna) the first one called rupa (colour) is that which can be apprehended by the eye alone and not by any other sense. The colours are white, blue, yellow, red, green, brown and variegated (citra). Colours are found only in kshiti, ap and tejas. The colours of ap and tejas are permanent (nitya), but the colour of kshiti changes when heat is applied, and this, Shridhara holds, is due to the fact that heat changes the atomic structure of kshiti (earth) and thus the old constitution of the substance being destroyed, its old colour is also destroyed, and a new one is generated. Rupa is the general name for the specific individual colours. There is the genus rupatva (colourness), and the rupa guna (quality) is that on which rests this genus; rupa is not itself a genus and can be apprehended by the eye. Read more »
akasha, atomic structure, guna, katu, natural taste, nitya, rasa, rupa, tejas, vayu Nyaya-Vaisheshika Theory of Causation
The Nyaya-Vaisheshika in most of its speculations took that view of things which finds expression in our language, and which we tacitly assume as true in all our ordinary experience. Thus they admitted dravya, guna, karma and samanya, Vishesha they had to admit as the ultimate peculiarities of atoms, for they did not admit that things were continually changing their qualities, and that everything could be produced out of everything by a change of the collocation or arrangement of the constituting atoms. Read more »
antecedent, atoms, axiom, guna, hypothesis, karma, material cause, molecular movement, speculations, unseen power Samkhya Proof of the Existence of Ishvara
Samkhya asserts that the teleology of the prakriti is sufficient to explain all order and arrangement of the cosmos. The Mimamsakas, the Carvakas, the Buddhists and the Jains all deny the existence of Ishvara (God). Nyaya believes that Ishvara has fashioned this universe by his will out of the ever-existing atoms. For every effect (e.g. a jug) must have its cause. If this be so, then this world with all its order and arrangement must also be due to the agency of some cause, and this cause is Ishvara. Read more »
atoms, buddhists, existence, fire in the forest, inference, jug, manifest world, teleology The Nyaya-Vaisheshika Physics
The four kinds of atoms are earth, water, fire, and air atoms. These have mass, number, weight, fluidity (or hardness), viscosity (or its opposite), velocity, characteristic potential colour, taste, smell, or touch, not produced by the chemical operation of heat. Akasha (space) is absolutely inert and structure-less being only as the substratum of sound, which is supposed to travel wave-like in the manifesting medium of air. Atomic combination is only possible with the four elements. Atoms cannot exist in an uncombined condition in the creation stage; atmospheric air however consists of atoms in an uncombined state. Read more »
akasha, elementary substance, four elements, hindus, molecule, vibratory motion, water fire The Origin of Knowledge (Pramana)
The manner in which knowledge originates is one of the most favourite topics of discussion in Indian philosophy. We have already seen that Samkhya-Yoga explained it by supposing that the buddhi (place of consciousness) assumed the form of the object of perception, and that the buddhi so transformed was then intelligized by the reflection of the pure intelligence or purusha. The Jains regarded the origin of any knowledge as being due to a withdrawal of a veil of karma which was covering the all-intelligence of the self. Read more »
cognition, collocation, indian philosophy, inference, intellectual elements, intelligence, linga, perception, physical elements, purusha The four Pramanas of Nyaya
We know that the Carvakas admitted perception (pratyaksha) alone as the valid source of knowledge. Read more »
analogy, incorporation, inference, manifestation, perception, principle, testimony Nyaya Perception (Pratyaksha)
The naiyayikas admitted only the five cognitive senses which they believed to be composed of one or other of the five elements. These senses could each come in contact with the special characteristic of that element of which they were composed. Thus the ear could perceive sound, because sound was the attribute of akasha, of which the auditory sense, the ear, was made up. The eye could send forth rays to receive the colour, etc., of things. Thus the cognitive senses can only manifest their specific objects by going over to them and thereby coming in contact with them. The cognitive senses (vak, pani, pada, payu, and upastha) recognized in Samkhya as separate senses are not recognized here as such for the functions of these so-called senses are discharged by the general motor functions of the body. Read more »
akasha, auditory sense, cognition, cognitive, concrete experience, five elements, motor functions, perception, perceptual process, right knowledge, senses, vak Ishvara and Salvation
Nyaya seeks to establish the existence of Ishvara on the basis of inference. We know that the Jains, the Samkhya and the Buddhists did not believe in the existence of Ishvara and offered many antitheistic arguments. Nyaya wanted to refute these and prove the existence of Ishvara by an inference of the samanyato-drishta type. The Jains and other atheists held that though things in the world have production and decay, the world as a whole was never produced, and it was never therefore an effect. In contrast to this view the Nyaya holds that the world as a whole is also an effect like any other effect. Read more »
atheists, buddhists, existence, inference, order of the universe Mimansa Philosophy - A Comparative Review
The Nyaya-Vaisheshika philosophy looked at experience from a purely common sense point of view and did not work with any such monistic tendency that the ultimate conceptions of our common sense experience should be considered as coming out of an original universal (e.g. prakriti of the Samkhya). Space, time, the four elements, soul, etc. convey the impression that they are substantive entities or substances. What is perceived of the material things as qualities such as colour, taste, etc. is regarded as so many entities which have distinct and separate existence but which manifest themselves in connection with the substances. Read more »
causation, common sense, four elements, jnana, material objects, monistic, sense experience, sense knowledge, substances The place of sense organs in perception
We have just said that knowledge arises by itself and that it could not have been generated by sense-contact. If this be so, the diversity of perceptions is however left unexplained. But in face of the Nyaya philosophy explaining all perceptions on the ground of diverse sense-contact the Mimamsa probably could not afford to remain silent on such an important point. Read more »
inference, notion, objective facts, perceptions, senses, validity, virtue Some Ontological Problems connected with the Doctrine of Perception
The perception of the class (jati) of a percept in relation to other things may thus be regarded in the main as a difference between determinate and indeterminate perceptions. The problems of jati and avayavavayavi (part and whole notion) were the subjects of hot dispute in Indian philosophy. Before entering into discussion about jati, Prabhakara first introduced the problem of avayava (part) and avayavi (whole).