Yoga breathing

We have now to meet the vexed question of the probable date of this famous Yoga author Patanjali. Weber had tried to connect him with Kapya Patamchala of Shatapatha Brahmana; in Katyayana’s Varttika we get the name Patanjali which is explained by later commentators as patantah anjalayah yasmai (for whom the hands are folded as a mark of reverence), but it is indeed difficult to come to any conclusion merely from the similarity of names (1). Read more »

commentators, grammarian, panini, patanjali, western scholars, yoga sutra

The word Yoga which was formerly used in Vedic literature in the sense of the restraint of the senses is used by Patanjali in his Yoga sutra in the sense of the partial or full restraint or steadying of the states of citta. Read more »

affliction, cognitive states, concentration, inner experience, mortal enemy, mukti, passions, patanjali, purpose of yoga, restraint, samsara, satisfactions, vedic literature, word yoga, yoga sutra

The Vaisheshika is so much associated with Nyaya by tradition that it seems at first sight quite unlikely that it could be supposed to represent an old school of Mimamsa, older than that represented in the Mimamsa sutras. But a closer inspection of the Vaisheshika sutras seems to confirm such a supposition in a very remarkable way. We have seen in the previous section that Caraka quotes a Vaisheshika sutra. Read more »

aphorisms, cognition, demerit, dharma, enumerated, gunas, samskara, sense qualities, sneha, supposition, universality

The Vaisheshika sutras begin with the ostensible purpose of explaining virtue (dharma) (I.i. 1) and dharma according to it is that by which prosperity (abhyudaya) and salvation (nihshreyasa) are attained. Then it goes on to say that the validity of the Vedas depends on the fact that it leads us to prosperity and salvation. Then it turns back to the second sutra and says that salvation comes as the result of real knowledge, produced by special excellence of dharma, of the characteristic features of the categories of substance (dravya), quality (guna), class concept (samdanya), particularity (vishesha), and inherence (samavayay) (1). Read more »

dharma, effect karma, guna, karma karma, material cause, odour, sutras, water fire

The Nyaya sutras begin with an enumeration of the sixteen subjects, viz. means of right knowledge (pramana), object of right knowledge (prameya), doubt (samshaya), purpose (prayojana), illustrative instances (drishtanta), accepted conclusions (siddhanta), premisses (avayava), argumentation (tarka), ascertainment (nirnaya), debates (vada), disputations (jalpa), destructive criticisms (vitanda), fallacy (hetvabhasa), quibble (chala), refutations (jati), points of opponent’s defeat (nigrahasthana), and hold that by a thorough knowledge of these the highest good (nihshreyasa), is attained. In the second sutra it is said that salvation (apavarga) is attained by the successive disappearance of false knowledge (mithyajnana), defects (dosha), endeavours (pravritti, birth (janma), and ultimately of sorrow (1). Read more »

apta, atman, body senses, chala, dosha, five senses, inference, jalpa, pain sorrow, perception, pleasure pain, right knowledge, self body, sense objects, tarka, testimony

When we compare the Nyaya sutras with the Vaisheshika sutras we find that in the former two or three differentstreams of purposes have met, whereas the latter is much more homogeneous. Read more »

authorities, caraka samhita, chala, debates, hindus, jalpa, logical categories, practical art, refutation, sanskrit literature, sutras

It is difficult to ascertain definitely the date of the Vaisheshika sutras by Kanada, also called Aulukya the son of Uluka, though there is every reason to suppose it to be pre-Buddhistic. It appears from the Vayu purana that he was born in Prabhasa near Dvaraka, and was the disciple of Somasharma. The time of Prashastapada who wrote a bhashya (commentary) of the Vaisheshika sutras cannot also unfortunately be ascertained. Read more »

commentaries, disciple, dissertation, exposition, gautama, kanada, purana, radha, ravana, shaka, shankara, sutras, udayana, vatsyayana

The Nyaya-Vaisheshika having dismissed the doctrine of momentariness took a common-sense view of things, and held that things remain permanent until suitable collocations so arrange themselves that the thing can be destroyed. Thus the jug continues to remain a jug unless or until it is broken to pieces by the stroke of a stick. Things exist not because they can produce an impression on us, or serve my purposes either directly or through knowledge, as the Buddhists suppose, but because existence is one of their characteristics. If I or you or any other perceiver did not exist, the things would continue to exist all the same. Whether they produce any effect on us or on their surrounding environments is immaterial. Existence is the most general characteristic of things, and it is on account of this that things are testified by experience to be existing (1). Read more »

akasha, cosmology, demerit, ear drum, existence, four elements, immaterial, kala, sense of hearing, sense organ, tejas, valid reasons

Of the six classes of entities or categories (padartha) we have already given some account of dravya (1). Let us now turn to the others. Of the qualities (guna) the first one called rupa (colour) is that which can be apprehended by the eye alone and not by any other sense. The colours are white, blue, yellow, red, green, brown and variegated (citra). Colours are found only in kshiti, ap and tejas. The colours of ap and tejas are permanent (nitya), but the colour of kshiti changes when heat is applied, and this, Shridhara holds, is due to the fact that heat changes the atomic structure of kshiti (earth) and thus the old constitution of the substance being destroyed, its old colour is also destroyed, and a new one is generated. Rupa is the general name for the specific individual colours. There is the genus rupatva (colourness), and the rupa guna (quality) is that on which rests this genus; rupa is not itself a genus and can be apprehended by the eye. Read more »

akasha, atomic structure, guna, katu, natural taste, nitya, rasa, rupa, tejas, vayu

The Nyaya-Vaisheshika in most of its speculations took that view of things which finds expression in our language, and which we tacitly assume as true in all our ordinary experience. Thus they admitted dravya, guna, karma and samanya, Vishesha they had to admit as the ultimate peculiarities of atoms, for they did not admit that things were continually changing their qualities, and that everything could be produced out of everything by a change of the collocation or arrangement of the constituting atoms. Read more »

antecedent, atoms, axiom, guna, hypothesis, karma, material cause, molecular movement, speculations, unseen power

I have pointed out above that Nyaya divided perception into two classes as nirvikalpa (indeterminate) and savikalpa (determinate) according as it is an earlier or a later stage. Vacaspati says, that at the first stage perception reveals an object as a particular; the perception of an orange at this avikalpika or nirvikalpika stage gives us indeed all its colour, form, and also the universal of orangeness associated with it, but it does not reveal it in a subject-predicate relation as when I say “this is an orange.” Read more »

consciously, differentiation, notion, perception, subject and predicate, unification, universals

Mind according to Nyaya is regarded as a separate sense and can come in contact with pleasure, pain, desire, antipathy and will. The later Nyaya writers speak of three other kinds of contact of a transcendental nature called samanyalakshana, jnanalakshana and yogaja (miraculous). The contact samanyalakshana is that by virtue of which by coming in contact with a particular we are transcendentally (alaukika) in contact with all the particulars (in a general way) of which the corresponding universal may be predicated. Thus when I see smoke and through it my sense is in contact with the universal associated with smoke my visual sense is in transcendental contact with all smoke in general. Jnanalakshana contact is that by virtue of which we can associate the perceptions of other senses when perceiving by any one sense. Thus when we are looking at a piece of sandal wood our visual sense is in touch with its colour only, but still we perceive it to be fragrant without any direct contact of the object with the organ of smell. The sort of transcendental contact (alaukika sannikarsha) by virtue of which this is rendered possible is called jnanalakshana. But the knowledge acquired by these two contacts is not counted as perception (1). Read more »

desire, direct contact, jnana, perceptions, pleasures, pleasure pain, senses, virtue, visual sense

It may not be out of place here to mention that in later Nyaya works great emphasis is laid on the necessity of getting ourselves assured that there was no such upadhi (condition) associated with the hetu on account of which the concomitance happened, but that the hetu was unconditionally associated with the sadhya in a relation of inseparable concomitance. Thus all fire does not produce smoke; fire must be associated with green wood in order to produce smoke. Green wood is thus the necessary condition (upadhi) without which, no smoke could be produced. It is on account of this condition that fire is associated with smoke; and so we cannot say that there is smoke because there is fire. But in the concomitance of smoke with fire there is no condition, and so in every case of smoke there is fire. In order to be assured of the validity of vyapti, it is necessary that we must be assured that there should be nothing associated with the hetu which conditioned the concomitance, and this must be settled by wide experience (bhuyodarshana). Read more »

inference, kanada, linga, necessary condition, opposition, smoke fire, validity, valid reason

Nyaya seeks to establish the existence of Ishvara on the basis of inference. We know that the Jains, the Samkhya and the Buddhists did not believe in the existence of Ishvara and offered many antitheistic arguments. Nyaya wanted to refute these and prove the existence of Ishvara by an inference of the samanyato-drishta type. The Jains and other atheists held that though things in the world have production and decay, the world as a whole was never produced, and it was never therefore an effect. In contrast to this view the Nyaya holds that the world as a whole is also an effect like any other effect. Read more »

atheists, buddhists, existence, inference, order of the universe

The perception of the class (jati) of a percept in relation to other things may thus be regarded in the main as a difference between determinate and indeterminate perceptions. The problems of jati and avayavavayavi (part and whole notion) were the subjects of hot dispute in Indian philosophy. Before entering into discussion about jati, Prabhakara first introduced the problem of avayava (part) and avayavi (whole). Read more »

atoms, consciousness, indian philosophy, jati, material cause, perceptions, true existence

Shabara says that when a certain fixed or permanent relation has been known to exist between two things, we can have the idea of one thing when the other one is perceived, and this kind of knowledge is called inference. Kumarila on the basis of this tries to show that inference is only possible when we notice that in a large number of cases two things (e.g. smoke and fire) subsist together in a third thing (e.g. kitchen, etc.) in some independent relation, i.e. when their coexistence does not depend upon any other eliminable condition or factor. Read more »

cause and effect, existence, infer, inference, rohini, smoke and fire

Ordinarily there are four chief divisions or castes (varna) of Hindu society – viz.: Brahmana (priesthood; teaching); Kshattriya (warrior); Vaishya (merchant); Shudra (servile) – said to have sprung respectively from the mouth, arm, thigh, and foot of Brahma. Read more »

brahman, caste, castes, hindu society, hybrid class, investiture, priesthood, sacred thread, tantra, twice born, vaishya, varna, vedas, vipra

This word is the common term for worship of which there are numerous synonyms in the Sanskrit language.(1) Puja is done daily of the Ista-devata or the particular Deity worshipped by the sadhaka - the Devi in the case of a Sakta, Visnu in the case of a Vaisnava, and so forth. Read more »

asana, ganesa, ista, puja, sanskrit language, visnu