Yoga pants
Yoga pants are special pants that are worn during yoga poses and mediations. Pants are often made of earth friendly and natural materials. Read more »
Yoga pants are special pants that are worn during yoga poses and mediations. Pants are often made of earth friendly and natural materials. Read more »
A yoga mat can be helpful in many ways: it can keep you from slipping while practicing your poses or it can provide some padding for knees, hips, and any place else where you don’t have your own padding. The traditional “sticky mat” is thin and doesn’t offer much padding, but newer, thicker versions are now being produced. With washable outer cover, provided with two sown-in carry handles suitable for a wide range of restorative and supported poses or as lounge furniture. Read more »
The Jute Eco Yoga Mat is made from jute and Polymer Environmental Resin. The jute fiber is excellent for any steady practice of Yoga, the jute material on top offers superb traction. The mat material gives a highly durable, tactile and pleasantly natural surface to practice on with excellent grip. Read more »
Tratak has many potential uses, but the word may simply be translated as (intense) concentration. Actually it means an unbroken gaze or attention fixed on an object, a steady gazing at a particular point or object without winking - looking at or into it. Read more »
The plurality of the Vedic gods may lead a superficial enquirer to think the faith of the Vedic people polytheistic. But an intelligent reader will find here neither polytheism nor monotheism but a simple primitive stage of belief to which both of these may be said to owe their origin. Read more »
It will however be wrong to suppose that these monotheistic tendencies were gradually supplanting the polytheistic sacrifices. On the other hand, the complications of ritualism were gradually growing in their elaborate details. Read more »
The cosmogony of the rig-Veda may be looked at from two aspects, the mythological and the philosophical. The mythological aspect has in general two currents, as Professor Macdonell says, “The one regards the universe as the result of mechanical production, the work of carpenter’s and joiner’s skill; the other represents it as the result of natural generation (1).” Read more »
The passage of the Indian mind from the Brahmanic to the Upanishad thought is probably the most remarkable event in the history of philosophic thought. We know that in the later Vedic hymns some monotheistic conceptions of great excellence were developed, but these differ in their nature from the absolutism of the Upanishads as much as the Ptolemaic and the Copernican systems in astronomy. Read more »
The change of the Brahmana into the Aranyaka thought is signified by a transference of values from the actual sacrifices to their symbolic representations and meditations which were regarded as being productive of various earthly benefits. Read more »
The doctrine which next attracts our attention in this connection is that of emancipation (mukti). Already we know that the doctrine of Devayana held that those who were faithful and performed asceticism (tapas) went by the way of the gods through successive stages never to return to the world and suffer rebirth. Read more »
It is hardly possible to attempt a history of Indian philosophy in the manner in which the histories of European philosophy have been written. Read more »
It is, however, remarkable that with the exception of the Carvaka materialists all the other systems agree on some fundamental points of importance. The systems of philosophy in India were not stirred up merely by the speculative demands of the human mind which has a natural inclination for indulging in abstract thought, but by a deep craving after the realization of the religious purpose of life. Read more »
Though the belief that the world is full of sorrow has not been equally prominently emphasized in all systems, yet it may be considered as being shared by all of them. It finds its strongest utterance in Samkhya, Yoga, and Buddhism. Read more »
The examination of the two ancient Nastika schools of Buddhism and Jainism of two different types ought to convince us that serious philosophical speculations were indulged in, in circles other than those of the Upanishad sages (1). Read more »
The main exposition of the system of Samkhya and Yoga in this section has been based on the Samkhya karika, the Samkhya sutras, and the Yoga sutras of Patanjali with their commentaries and sub-commentaries. The Samkhya karika (about 200 A.D.) was written by Ishvarakrishna. Read more »
It is important for the history of Samkhya philosophy that Caraka’s treatment of it, which so far as I know has never been dealt with in any of the modern studies of Samkhya, should be brought before the notice of the students of this philosophy. Read more »
Pancashikha speaks of the ultimate truth as being avyakta (a term applied in all Samkhya literature to prakriti) in the state of purusha (purusavasthamavyaktam). If man is the product of a mere combination of the different elements, then one may assume that all ceases with death. Read more »
The earliest descriptions of a Samkhya which agrees with Ishvarakrishna’s Samkhya (but with an addition of Ishvara) are to be found in Patanjali’s Yoga sutras and in the Mahabharata; but we are pretty certain that the Samkhya of Caraka we have sketched here was known to Patanjali, for in Yoga sutra I. 19 a reference is made to a view of Samkhya similar to this. Read more »
A word of explanation is necessary as regards my interpretation of the Samkhya-Yoga system. The Samkhya karika is the oldest Samkhya text on which we have commentaries by later writers. Read more »
Regrettable as it may be, we are immersed in a tension-filled world. It is this very tension that forms the basis for many psychosomatic disturbances. Psychiatry offers tranquillizers but Hatha Yoga offers drugless, inner relaxation through the thousands-years-old process known as ‘Shavasana’. Read more »
The word yoga occurs in the rig-Veda in various senses such as yoking or harnessing, achieving the unachieved, connection, and the like. Read more »
A question naturally arises, that if the knowledge forms are made up of some sort of stuff as the objective forms of matter are, why then should the purusha illuminate it and not external material objects. Read more »
These three types of ultimate subtle entities are technically called guna in Samkhya philosophy (1). Read more »
Samkhya believes that before this world came into being there was such a state of dissolution–a state in which the guna compounds had disintegrated into a state of disunion and had by their mutual opposition produced an equilibrium the prakriti. Read more »
But how or rather why prakriti should be disturbed is the most knotty point in Samkhya. It is postulated that the prakriti or the sum-total of the gunas is so connected with the purushas, and there is such an inherent teleology or blind purpose in the lifeless prakriti, that all its evolution and transformations tike place for the sake of the diverse purushas, to serve the enjoyment of pleasures and sufferance of pain through experiences, and finally leading them to absolute freedom or mukti. Read more »
The question is raised, how can the prakriti supply the deficiencies made in its evolutes by the formation of other evolutes from them? When from mahat some tanmatras have evolved, or when from the tanmatras some atoms have evolved, how can the deficiency in mahat and the tanmatras be made good by the prakriti? (1). Read more »
It is easy to see from what we have already said that any collocation of atoms forming a thing could not change its form, unless the barrier inherent or caused by the formation of the present collocation could be removed by some other extraneous instrumental cause. Read more »
Granted that the interchange of the positions of the infinite number of reals produce all the world and its transformations; whence comes this fixed order of the universe, the fixed order of cause and effect, the fixed order of the so-called barriers which prevent the transformation of any cause into any effect or the first disturbance of the equilibrium of the prakriti? Read more »
It has been said that buddhi and the internal objects have evolved in order to giving scope to the experience of the purusha. What is the process of this experience? Read more »
The word Yoga which was formerly used in Vedic literature in the sense of the restraint of the senses is used by Patanjali in his Yoga sutra in the sense of the partial or full restraint or steadying of the states of citta. Read more »
It is very probable that the earliest beginnings of Nyaya are to be found in the disputations and debates amongst scholars trying to find out the right meanings of the Vedic texts for use in sacrifices and also in those disputations which took place between the adherents of different schools of thought trying to defeat one another. Read more »
The Vaisheshika is so much associated with Nyaya by tradition that it seems at first sight quite unlikely that it could be supposed to represent an old school of Mimamsa, older than that represented in the Mimamsa sutras. But a closer inspection of the Vaisheshika sutras seems to confirm such a supposition in a very remarkable way. We have seen in the previous section that Caraka quotes a Vaisheshika sutra. Read more »
The Vaisheshika sutras begin with the ostensible purpose of explaining virtue (dharma) (I.i. 1) and dharma according to it is that by which prosperity (abhyudaya) and salvation (nihshreyasa) are attained. Then it goes on to say that the validity of the Vedas depends on the fact that it leads us to prosperity and salvation. Then it turns back to the second sutra and says that salvation comes as the result of real knowledge, produced by special excellence of dharma, of the characteristic features of the categories of substance (dravya), quality (guna), class concept (samdanya), particularity (vishesha), and inherence (samavayay) (1). Read more »
The Nyaya sutras begin with an enumeration of the sixteen subjects, viz. means of right knowledge (pramana), object of right knowledge (prameya), doubt (samshaya), purpose (prayojana), illustrative instances (drishtanta), accepted conclusions (siddhanta), premisses (avayava), argumentation (tarka), ascertainment (nirnaya), debates (vada), disputations (jalpa), destructive criticisms (vitanda), fallacy (hetvabhasa), quibble (chala), refutations (jati), points of opponent’s defeat (nigrahasthana), and hold that by a thorough knowledge of these the highest good (nihshreyasa), is attained. In the second sutra it is said that salvation (apavarga) is attained by the successive disappearance of false knowledge (mithyajnana), defects (dosha), endeavours (pravritti, birth (janma), and ultimately of sorrow (1). Read more »
Of the six classes of entities or categories (padartha) we have already given some account of dravya (1). Let us now turn to the others. Of the qualities (guna) the first one called rupa (colour) is that which can be apprehended by the eye alone and not by any other sense. The colours are white, blue, yellow, red, green, brown and variegated (citra). Colours are found only in kshiti, ap and tejas. The colours of ap and tejas are permanent (nitya), but the colour of kshiti changes when heat is applied, and this, Shridhara holds, is due to the fact that heat changes the atomic structure of kshiti (earth) and thus the old constitution of the substance being destroyed, its old colour is also destroyed, and a new one is generated. Rupa is the general name for the specific individual colours. There is the genus rupatva (colourness), and the rupa guna (quality) is that on which rests this genus; rupa is not itself a genus and can be apprehended by the eye. Read more »
The Nyaya-Vaisheshika in most of its speculations took that view of things which finds expression in our language, and which we tacitly assume as true in all our ordinary experience. Thus they admitted dravya, guna, karma and samanya, Vishesha they had to admit as the ultimate peculiarities of atoms, for they did not admit that things were continually changing their qualities, and that everything could be produced out of everything by a change of the collocation or arrangement of the constituting atoms. Read more »
The doctrine of pralaya is accepted by all the Hindu systems except the Mimamsa (1). According to the Nyaya-Vaisheshika view Ishvara wishing to give some respite or rest to all living beings desires to bring about dissolution (samhareccho bhavati). Simultaneously with it the adrishta force residing in all the souls and forming bodies, senses, and the gross elements, ceases to act (shakti-pratibandha). Read more »
The manner in which knowledge originates is one of the most favourite topics of discussion in Indian philosophy. We have already seen that Samkhya-Yoga explained it by supposing that the buddhi (place of consciousness) assumed the form of the object of perception, and that the buddhi so transformed was then intelligized by the reflection of the pure intelligence or purusha. The Jains regarded the origin of any knowledge as being due to a withdrawal of a veil of karma which was covering the all-intelligence of the self. Read more »
Inference (anumana) is the second means of proof (pramana) and the most valuable contribution that Nyaya has made on this subject. It consists in making an assertion about a thing on the strength of the mark or linga which is associated with it, as when finding smoke rising from a hill we remember that since smoke cannot be without fire, there must also be fire in yonder hill. In an example like this smoke is technically called linga, or hetu. Read more »
It may not be out of place here to mention that in later Nyaya works great emphasis is laid on the necessity of getting ourselves assured that there was no such upadhi (condition) associated with the hetu on account of which the concomitance happened, but that the hetu was unconditionally associated with the sadhya in a relation of inseparable concomitance. Thus all fire does not produce smoke; fire must be associated with green wood in order to produce smoke. Green wood is thus the necessary condition (upadhi) without which, no smoke could be produced. It is on account of this condition that fire is associated with smoke; and so we cannot say that there is smoke because there is fire. But in the concomitance of smoke with fire there is no condition, and so in every case of smoke there is fire. In order to be assured of the validity of vyapti, it is necessary that we must be assured that there should be nothing associated with the hetu which conditioned the concomitance, and this must be settled by wide experience (bhuyodarshana). Read more »
The problem of negation or non-existence (abhava) is of great interest in Indian philosophy. In this section we can describe its nature only from the point of view of perceptibility. Read more »
Nyaya seeks to establish the existence of Ishvara on the basis of inference. We know that the Jains, the Samkhya and the Buddhists did not believe in the existence of Ishvara and offered many antitheistic arguments. Nyaya wanted to refute these and prove the existence of Ishvara by an inference of the samanyato-drishta type. The Jains and other atheists held that though things in the world have production and decay, the world as a whole was never produced, and it was never therefore an effect. In contrast to this view the Nyaya holds that the world as a whole is also an effect like any other effect. Read more »
The Nyaya-Vaisheshika philosophy looked at experience from a purely common sense point of view and did not work with any such monistic tendency that the ultimate conceptions of our common sense experience should be considered as coming out of an original universal (e.g. prakriti of the Samkhya). Space, time, the four elements, soul, etc. convey the impression that they are substantive entities or substances. What is perceived of the material things as qualities such as colour, taste, etc. is regarded as so many entities which have distinct and separate existence but which manifest themselves in connection with the substances. Read more »
The doctrine of the self-validity of knowledge (svatah-pramanya) forms the cornerstone on which the whole structure of the Mimamsa philosophy is based. Validity means the certitude of truth. The Mimamsa philosophy asserts that all knowledge excepting the action of remembering (smriti) or memory is valid in itself, for it itself certifies its own truth, and neither depends on any other extraneous condition nor on any other knowledge for its validity. Read more »
We have just said that knowledge arises by itself and that it could not have been generated by sense-contact. If this be so, the diversity of perceptions is however left unexplained. But in face of the Nyaya philosophy explaining all perceptions on the ground of diverse sense-contact the Mimamsa probably could not afford to remain silent on such an important point. Read more »
Shabara says that when a certain fixed or permanent relation has been known to exist between two things, we can have the idea of one thing when the other one is perceived, and this kind of knowledge is called inference. Kumarila on the basis of this tries to show that inference is only possible when we notice that in a large number of cases two things (e.g. smoke and fire) subsist together in a third thing (e.g. kitchen, etc.) in some independent relation, i.e. when their coexistence does not depend upon any other eliminable condition or factor. Read more »
Shabda or word is regarded as a separate means of proof by most of the recognized Indian systems of thought excepting the Jaina, Buddhist, Carvaka and Vaisheshika. A discussion on this topic however has but little philosophical value and I have therefore omitted to give any attention to it in connection with the Nyaya, and the Samkhya-Yoga systems. The validity and authority of the Vedas were acknowledged by all Hindu writers and they had wordy battles over it with the Buddhists who denied it. Read more »
In addition to the above pramanas Kumarila admits a fifth kind of pramana, viz. anupalabdhi for the perception of the non-existence of a thing. Kumarila argues that the non-existence of a thing (e.g. there is no jug in this room) cannot be perceived by the senses, for there is nothing with which the senses could come into contact in order to perceive the non-existence. Read more »