Yoga breathing

The Hindus classify the systems of philosophy into two classes, namely, the nastika and the astika. The nastika (na asti “it is not”) views are those which neither regard the Vedas as infallible nor try to establish their own validity on their authority. These are principally three in number, the Buddhist, Jaina and the Carvaka. The astika-mata or orthodox schools are six in number, Samkhya, Yoga, Vedanta, Mimamsa, Nyaya and Vaisheshika, generally known as the six systems (shaddarshana (1)). Read more »

atman, carvaka, kapila, liberation, metaphysical position, mystical practices, orthodox schools, patanjali, philosophy, vedas, vedic texts, yoga practices, yoga sutras, yoga system, yoga vedanta

The examination of the two ancient Nastika schools of Buddhism and Jainism of two different types ought to convince us that serious philosophical speculations were indulged in, in circles other than those of the Upanishad sages (1). Read more »

attainment, brahmanas, magical power, philosophical speculations, sacrifices, sages, upanishads, vedas, vedic

It is very probable that the earliest beginnings of Nyaya are to be found in the disputations and debates amongst scholars trying to find out the right meanings of the Vedic texts for use in sacrifices and also in those disputations which took place between the adherents of different schools of thought trying to defeat one another. Read more »

buehler, compound words, kautilya, logic, scriptural knowledge, upanishads, vatsyayana, vedic accents, vedic texts, vidya

The Vaisheshika is so much associated with Nyaya by tradition that it seems at first sight quite unlikely that it could be supposed to represent an old school of Mimamsa, older than that represented in the Mimamsa sutras. But a closer inspection of the Vaisheshika sutras seems to confirm such a supposition in a very remarkable way. We have seen in the previous section that Caraka quotes a Vaisheshika sutra. Read more »

aphorisms, cognition, demerit, dharma, enumerated, gunas, samskara, sense qualities, sneha, supposition, universality

When we compare the Nyaya sutras with the Vaisheshika sutras we find that in the former two or three differentstreams of purposes have met, whereas the latter is much more homogeneous. Read more »

authorities, caraka samhita, chala, debates, hindus, jalpa, logical categories, practical art, refutation, sanskrit literature, sutras

The Nyaya-Vaisheshika in most of its speculations took that view of things which finds expression in our language, and which we tacitly assume as true in all our ordinary experience. Thus they admitted dravya, guna, karma and samanya, Vishesha they had to admit as the ultimate peculiarities of atoms, for they did not admit that things were continually changing their qualities, and that everything could be produced out of everything by a change of the collocation or arrangement of the constituting atoms. Read more »

antecedent, atoms, axiom, guna, hypothesis, karma, material cause, molecular movement, speculations, unseen power

The doctrine of pralaya is accepted by all the Hindu systems except the Mimamsa (1). According to the Nyaya-Vaisheshika view Ishvara wishing to give some respite or rest to all living beings desires to bring about dissolution (samhareccho bhavati). Simultaneously with it the adrishta force residing in all the souls and forming bodies, senses, and the gross elements, ceases to act (shakti-pratibandha). Read more »

atoms, bodies, desire, dharma, disintegration, dissolution, intelligent entities, manas, natural condition, samskara, senses, shakti, tejas, world creation

Samkhya asserts that the teleology of the prakriti is sufficient to explain all order and arrangement of the cosmos. The Mimamsakas, the Carvakas, the Buddhists and the Jains all deny the existence of Ishvara (God). Nyaya believes that Ishvara has fashioned this universe by his will out of the ever-existing atoms. For every effect (e.g. a jug) must have its cause. If this be so, then this world with all its order and arrangement must also be due to the agency of some cause, and this cause is Ishvara. Read more »

atoms, buddhists, existence, fire in the forest, inference, jug, manifest world, teleology

Inference (anumana) is the second means of proof (pramana) and the most valuable contribution that Nyaya has made on this subject. It consists in making an assertion about a thing on the strength of the mark or linga which is associated with it, as when finding smoke rising from a hill we remember that since smoke cannot be without fire, there must also be fire in yonder hill. In an example like this smoke is technically called linga, or hetu. Read more »

asat, assertion, inference, linga, perception, satta, shastra, testimony

Dhurtta Carvakas denied the existence of soul and regarded consciousness and life as products of bodily changes; there were other Carvakas called Sushikshita Carvakas who admitted the existence of soul but thought that it was destroyed at death. Read more »

atman, emotion, existence, inference, metaphysics, notion, perception, pleasures, self consciousness

The Nyaya-Vaisheshika philosophy looked at experience from a purely common sense point of view and did not work with any such monistic tendency that the ultimate conceptions of our common sense experience should be considered as coming out of an original universal (e.g. prakriti of the Samkhya). Space, time, the four elements, soul, etc. convey the impression that they are substantive entities or substances. What is perceived of the material things as qualities such as colour, taste, etc. is regarded as so many entities which have distinct and separate existence but which manifest themselves in connection with the substances. Read more »

causation, common sense, four elements, jnana, material objects, monistic, sense experience, sense knowledge, substances

It is difficult to say how the sacrificial system of worship grew in India in the Brahmanas. This system once set up gradually began to develop into a net-work of elaborate rituals, the details of which were probably taken note of by the priests. As some generations passed and the sacrifices spread over larger tracts of India and grew up into more and more elaborate details, the old rules and regulations began to be collected probably as tradition had it, and this it seems gave rise to the smriti literature. Read more »

brahmanas, commentaries, enquiry, ganganatha jha, india, literature discussions, sacrifices, sacrificial rituals, sutras

The doctrine of the self-validity of knowledge (svatah-pramanya) forms the cornerstone on which the whole structure of the Mimamsa philosophy is based. Validity means the certitude of truth. The Mimamsa philosophy asserts that all knowledge excepting the action of remembering (smriti) or memory is valid in itself, for it itself certifies its own truth, and neither depends on any other extraneous condition nor on any other knowledge for its validity. Read more »

infer, objective truth, perception, philosophy, representation, revelation, validity, visual contact

We have just said that knowledge arises by itself and that it could not have been generated by sense-contact. If this be so, the diversity of perceptions is however left unexplained. But in face of the Nyaya philosophy explaining all perceptions on the ground of diverse sense-contact the Mimamsa probably could not afford to remain silent on such an important point. Read more »

inference, notion, objective facts, perceptions, senses, validity, virtue

The perception of the class (jati) of a percept in relation to other things may thus be regarded in the main as a difference between determinate and indeterminate perceptions. The problems of jati and avayavavayavi (part and whole notion) were the subjects of hot dispute in Indian philosophy. Before entering into discussion about jati, Prabhakara first introduced the problem of avayava (part) and avayavi (whole). Read more »

atoms, consciousness, indian philosophy, jati, material cause, perceptions, true existence

All knowledge involves the knower, the known object, and the knowledge at the same identical moment. All knowledge whether perceptual, inferential or of any other kind must necessarily reveal the self or the knower directly. Thus as in all knowledge the self is directly and immediately perceived, all knowledge may be regarded as perception from the point of view of self. Read more »

appearance, cognition, deep sleep, dharma, dreams, inferential, perception, perceptual, reference to, remembrance

The question however arises that if all apprehensions are valid, how are we to account for illusory perceptions which cannot be regarded as valid? The problem of illusory perception and its psychology is a very favourite topic of discussion in Indian philosophy. Read more »

conch shell, illusion, illusory appearance, indian philosophy, perception, piece of silver, psychology

Shabara says that when a certain fixed or permanent relation has been known to exist between two things, we can have the idea of one thing when the other one is perceived, and this kind of knowledge is called inference. Kumarila on the basis of this tries to show that inference is only possible when we notice that in a large number of cases two things (e.g. smoke and fire) subsist together in a third thing (e.g. kitchen, etc.) in some independent relation, i.e. when their coexistence does not depend upon any other eliminable condition or factor. Read more »

cause and effect, existence, infer, inference, rohini, smoke and fire

Analogy (upamana) is accepted by Mimamsa in a sense which is different from that in which Nyaya took it. The man who has seen a cow (go) goes to the forest and sees a wild ox (gavaya), and apprehends the similarity of the gavaya with the go, and then cognizes the similarity of the go (which is not within the limits of his perception then) with the gavaya. Read more »

analogy, cognition, doubt, existence, perception, psychological analysis, remembrance

Shabda or word is regarded as a separate means of proof by most of the recognized Indian systems of thought excepting the Jaina, Buddhist, Carvaka and Vaisheshika. A discussion on this topic however has but little philosophical value and I have therefore omitted to give any attention to it in connection with the Nyaya, and the Samkhya-Yoga systems. The validity and authority of the Vedas were acknowledged by all Hindu writers and they had wordy battles over it with the Buddhists who denied it. Read more »

carvaka, philosophical value, sutras, vedas

Mimamsa has to accept the existence of soul, for without it who would perform the Vedic commandments, and what would be the meaning of those Vedic texts which speak of men as performing sacrifices and going to Heaven thereby? The soul is thus regarded as something entirely distinct from the body, the sense organs, and buddhi; it is eternal, omnipresent, and many, one in each body. Prabhakara thinks that it is manifested to us in all cognitions. Indeed he makes this also a proof for the existence of self as a separate entity from the body, for had it not been so, why should we have the notion of self-persistence in all our cognitions–even in those where there is no perception of the body? Read more »

consciousness, existence, going to heaven, pleasure pain, sacrifices, sense organs, true reason, vedic texts

From what we have said before it will be easy to see that Mimamsa agrees in the main with Vaisheshika about the existence of the categories of things such as the five elements, the qualities, rupa, rasa, etc. Kumarila’s differences on the points of jati, samavaya, etc. and Prabhakara’s peculiarities have also been mentioned before. On some of these points it appears that Kumarila was influenced by Samkhya thought rather than by Nyaya. Samkhya and Vaisheshika are the only Hindu systems which have tried to construct a physics as a part of their metaphysics; other systems have generally followed them or have differed from them only on minor matters. The physics of Prabhakara and Kumarila have thus but little importance, as they agree in general with the Vaisheshika view. In fact they were justified in not laying any special stress on this part, because for the performance of sacrifices the common-sense view of Nyaya-Vaisheshika about the world was most suitable. Read more »

dharma, five elements, inference, injunctions, rasa, sacrifices, theory of knowledge, valid knowledge, veda

Comprehension of the philosophical Issues more essential than the Dialectic of controversy. Read more »

attainment, epistemological, perceptions, philosophical issues, psychological experience, right knowledge, sanskrit, theory of knowledge

Vedanta philosophy is the philosophy which claims to be the exposition of the philosophy taught in the Upanishads and summarized in the Brahma-sutras of Badarayana. The Upanishads form the last part of the Veda literature, and its philosophy is therefore also called sometimes the Uttara-Mimamsa or the Mimamsa (decision) of the later part of the Vedas as distinguished from the Mimamsa of the previous part of the Vedas and the Brahmanas as incorporated in the Purvamimamsa sutras of Jaimini. Read more »

brahmanas, brahma sutras, commentaries, hindu, ramanuja, shankara, upanishads, vedanta philosophy, vedas

The main idea of the advaita (non-dualistic) Vedanta philosophy as taught by the Shankara school is this, that the ultimate and absolute truth is the self, which is one, though appearing as many in different individuals. The world also as apart from us the individuals has no reality and has no other truth to show than this self. All other events, mental or physical, are but passing appearances, while the only absolute and unchangeable truth underlying them all is the self. Read more »

absolute truth, advaita, akara, appearances, brahman, cognition, comprehension, duality, macrocosm, microcosm, objective truth, passions, preceptor, sensations, vedanta philosophy, world consciousness

The world-appearance is not however so illusory as the perception of silver in the conch-shell, for the latter type of worldly illusions is called pratibhasika, as they are contradicted by other later experiences, whereas the illusion of world-appearance is never contradicted in this worldly stage and is thus called vyavaharika (from vyavahara, practice, i.e. that on which is based all our practical movements). Read more »

appearance, brahman, consciousness, illusions, perception, right knowledge, sattva, true reality, vedanta

Pramana is the means that leads to right knowledge. If memory is intended to be excluded from the definition then pramana is to be defined as the means that leads to such right knowledge as has not already been acquired. Right knowledge (prama) in Vedanta is the knowledge of an object which has not been found contradicted (abadhitarthavishayajnanatva). Except when specially expressed otherwise, prama is generally considered as being excludent of memory and applies to previously unacquired (anadhigata) and uncontradicted knowledge (1). Read more »

memory, mental state, perception, previous moments, right knowledge, vedanta

The inner experiences of pleasure and pain also are generated by a false identification of antahkarana transformations as pleasure or pain with the self, by virtue of which are generated the perceptions, “I am happy,” or “I am sorry.” Read more »

antahkarana, false identification, inference, inner experiences, manifestation, perception, pleasure and pain, vedanta

We have already seen that the Mimamsists had asserted that all knowledge was true simply because it was knowledge (yatharthah sarve vivadaspadibhutah pratyayah pratyayatvat). Even illusions were explained by them as being non-perception of the distinction between the thing perceived (e.g. the conch-shell), and the thing remembered (e.g. silver). Read more »

illusions, perception, presence, vedanta

Vedanta says that when a duly qualified man takes to the study of Vedanta and is instructed by the preceptor - “Thou art that (Brahman),” he attains the emancipating knowledge, and the world-appearance becomes for him false and illusory. Read more »

attainment, karma, right knowledge, selfish desires, vedanta, vedas, worldly enjoyments

Vedanta is distinctly antagonistic to Nyaya, and most of its powerful dialectic criticism is generally directed against it. Shankara himself had begun it by showing contradictions and inconsistencies in many of the Nyaya conceptions, such as the theory of causation, conception of the atom, the relation of samavaya, the conception of jati, etc (1). Read more »

maya, rajas, sattva, shankara, vedanta, vedas, yoga