The Atman doctrine

The sum and substance of the Upanishad teaching is involved in the equation Atman=Brahman. We have already seen that the word Atman was used in the rig-Veda to denote on the one hand the ultimate essence of the universe, and on the other the vital breath in man. Later on in the Upanishads we see that the word Brahman is generally used in the former sense, while the word Atman is reserved to denote the inmost essence in man, and the Upanishads are emphatic in their declaration that the two are one and the same. Read more »

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Emancipation

The doctrine which next attracts our attention in this connection is that of emancipation (mukti). Already we know that the doctrine of Devayana held that those who were faithful and performed asceticism (tapas) went by the way of the gods through successive stages never to return to the world and suffer rebirth. Read more »

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Samkhya in Patanjali’s Yoga sutras

The earliest descriptions of a Samkhya which agrees with Ishvarakrishna’s Samkhya (but with an addition of Ishvara) are to be found in Patanjali’s Yoga sutras and in the Mahabharata; but we are pretty certain that the Samkhya of Caraka we have sketched here was known to Patanjali, for in Yoga sutra I. 19 a reference is made to a view of Samkhya similar to this. Read more »

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Samkhya karika, Samkhya sutra, Vacaspati Mishra and Vijnana Bhikshu

A word of explanation is necessary as regards my interpretation of the Samkhya-Yoga system. The Samkhya karika is the oldest Samkhya text on which we have commentaries by later writers. Read more »

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The Samkhya and the Yoga Doctrine of Soul or Purusha

The Samkhya philosophy as we have it now admits two principles, souls and prakriti, the root principle of matter. Souls are many, like the Jaina souls, but they are without parts and qualities. Read more »

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The Gunas

These three types of ultimate subtle entities are technically called guna in Samkhya philosophy (1). Read more »

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The main doctrine of the Nyaya-Vaisheshika Philosophy

The Nyaya-Vaisheshika having dismissed the doctrine of momentariness took a common-sense view of things, and held that things remain permanent until suitable collocations so arrange themselves that the thing can be destroyed. Thus the jug continues to remain a jug unless or until it is broken to pieces by the stroke of a stick. Things exist not because they can produce an impression on us, or serve my purposes either directly or through knowledge, as the Buddhists suppose, but because existence is one of their characteristics. If I or you or any other perceiver did not exist, the things would continue to exist all the same. Whether they produce any effect on us or on their surrounding environments is immaterial. Existence is the most general characteristic of things, and it is on account of this that things are testified by experience to be existing (1). Read more »

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Nyaya Perception (Pratyaksha)

The naiyayikas admitted only the five cognitive senses which they believed to be composed of one or other of the five elements. These senses could each come in contact with the special characteristic of that element of which they were composed. Thus the ear could perceive sound, because sound was the attribute of akasha, of which the auditory sense, the ear, was made up. The eye could send forth rays to receive the colour, etc., of things. Thus the cognitive senses can only manifest their specific objects by going over to them and thereby coming in contact with them. The cognitive senses (vak, pani, pada, payu, and upastha) recognized in Samkhya as separate senses are not recognized here as such for the functions of these so-called senses are discharged by the general motor functions of the body. Read more »

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Nyaya two classes of perception

I have pointed out above that Nyaya divided perception into two classes as nirvikalpa (indeterminate) and savikalpa (determinate) according as it is an earlier or a later stage. Vacaspati says, that at the first stage perception reveals an object as a particular; the perception of an orange at this avikalpika or nirvikalpika stage gives us indeed all its colour, form, and also the universal of orangeness associated with it, but it does not reveal it in a subject-predicate relation as when I say “this is an orange.” Read more »

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Some Ontological Problems connected with the Doctrine of Perception

The perception of the class (jati) of a percept in relation to other things may thus be regarded in the main as a difference between determinate and indeterminate perceptions. The problems of jati and avayavavayavi (part and whole notion) were the subjects of hot dispute in Indian philosophy. Before entering into discussion about jati, Prabhakara first introduced the problem of avayava (part) and avayavi (whole). Read more »

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Shankara and the Upanishad

The Mimamsists held that everything that is said in the Vedas is to be interpreted as requiring us to perform particular kinds of action, or to desist from doing certain other kinds. This would mean that the Upanishads being a part of the Veda should also be interpreted as containing injunctions for the performance of certain kinds of actions. The description of Brahman in the Upanishads does not therefore represent a simple statement of the nature of Brahman, but it implies that the Brahman should be meditated upon as possessing the particular nature described there, i.e. Brahman should be meditated upon as being an entity which possesses a nature which is identical with our self; such a procedure would then lead to beneficial results to the man who so meditates. Shankara could not agree to such a view. For his main point was that the Upanishads revealed the highest truth as the Brahman. No meditation or worship or action of any kind was required; but one reached absolute wisdom and emancipation when the truth dawned on him that the Brahman or self was the ultimate reality. The teachings of the other parts of the Vedas, the karmakanda (those dealing with the injunctions relating to the performance of duties and actions), were intended for inferior types of aspirants, whereas the teachings of the Upanishads, the jnanakanda (those which declare the nature of ultimate truth and reality), were intended only for superior aspirants who had transcended the limits of sacrificial duties and actions, and who had no desire for any earthly blessing or for any heavenly joy. Read more »

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Locus and Object of Ajnana, Ahamkara, and Antahkarana

This ajnana rests on the pure cit or intelligence. This cit or Brahman is of the nature of pure illumination, but yet it is not opposed to the ajnana or the indefinite. The cit becomes opposed to the ajnana and destroys it only when it is reflected through the mental states (vritti). The ajnana thus rests on the pure cit and not on the cit as associated with such illusory impositions as go to produce the notion of ego “aham” or the individual soul. Read more »

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Mokśa

Of the four aims, mokśa or mukti is the truly ultimate end, for the other three are ever haunted by the fear of Death, the Ender.(1)

Mukti means “loosening” or liberation. It is advisable to avoid the term “salvation,” as also other Christian terms, which connote different, though in a loose sense, analogous ideas. According to the Christian doctrine (soteriology), faith in Christ’s Gospel and in His Church effects salvation, which is the forgiveness of sins mediated by Christ’s redeeming activity, saving from judgment, and admitting to the Kingdom of God. Read more »

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