The change of the Brahmana into the Aranyaka thought is signified by a transference of values from the actual sacrifices to their symbolic representations and meditations which were regarded as being productive of various earthly benefits. Read more »
brahmana, brahmins, material substances, meditations, prana, real truth, rig veda, sacrificial rituals, samaveda, symbolic representations, vital functions When the Vedic people witnessed the burning of a dead body they supposed that the eye of the man went to the sun, his breath to the wind, his speech to the fire, his limbs to the different parts of the universe. They also believed as we have already seen in the recompense of good and bad actions in worlds other than our own, and though we hear of such things as the passage of the human soul into trees, etc., the tendency towards transmigration had but little developed at the time. Read more »
asceticism, charitable deeds, dark half, doctrine of transmigration, good deeds, recompense, sun moon, upanishads, vedic, way of the gods, womb It is important for the history of Samkhya philosophy that Caraka’s treatment of it, which so far as I know has never been dealt with in any of the modern studies of Samkhya, should be brought before the notice of the students of this philosophy. Read more »
akasa, atman, auditory sense, cognition, five elements, five senses, illuminations, karma, manas, pleasure pain, purusha, samkhya philosophy, sense of touch, visual sense Pancashikha speaks of the ultimate truth as being avyakta (a term applied in all Samkhya literature to prakriti) in the state of purusha (purusavasthamavyaktam). If man is the product of a mere combination of the different elements, then one may assume that all ceases with death. Read more »
annihilation, atman, existence, gunas, moksha, moral responsibility, purusha, renunciation The earliest descriptions of a Samkhya which agrees with Ishvarakrishna’s Samkhya (but with an addition of Ishvara) are to be found in Patanjali’s Yoga sutras and in the Mahabharata; but we are pretty certain that the Samkhya of Caraka we have sketched here was known to Patanjali, for in Yoga sutra I. 19 a reference is made to a view of Samkhya similar to this. Read more »
history of philosophy, kapila, mahabharata, oneness, patanjali, purusha, siddhis, upanishad, yoga sutra, yoga sutras A word of explanation is necessary as regards my interpretation of the Samkhya-Yoga system. The Samkhya karika is the oldest Samkhya text on which we have commentaries by later writers. Read more »
commentaries, gunas, intelligence, reference to, sutras, upanishads, yoga system Samkhya believes that before this world came into being there was such a state of dissolution–a state in which the guna compounds had disintegrated into a state of disunion and had by their mutual opposition produced an equilibrium the prakriti. Read more »
Cosmic Evolution, gunas, manifestation, mutual opposition, phenomenal product, phenomenon, rajas, resistance, sattva, tendencies The first evolute of the prakriti is generated by a preponderance of the sattva (intelligence-stuff). This is indeed the earliest state from which all the rest of the world has sprung forth; and it is a state in which the stuff of sattva predominates. It thus holds within it the minds (buddhi) of all purushas which were lost in the prakriti during the pralaya. Read more »
buddhis, evolutions, existence, first transformation, intelligence, purusha, sattva, state of evolution The other tendency, namely that of tamas, has to be helped by the liberated rajas of ahamkara, in order to make itself preponderant, and this state in which the tamas succeeds in overcoming the sattva side which was so preponderant in the buddhi, is called bhutadi (1). Read more »
emanation, gross elements, potentials, quantum, radiant heat, rajas, sattva, subtle matter, tamas, vibratory It has been said that buddhi and the internal objects have evolved in order to giving scope to the experience of the purusha. What is the process of this experience? Read more »
abstraction, consciousness, imagination, manas, perception, purusha, sattva, senses, sense data It is very probable that the earliest beginnings of Nyaya are to be found in the disputations and debates amongst scholars trying to find out the right meanings of the Vedic texts for use in sacrifices and also in those disputations which took place between the adherents of different schools of thought trying to defeat one another. Read more »
buehler, compound words, kautilya, logic, scriptural knowledge, upanishads, vatsyayana, vedic accents, vedic texts, vidya The Vaisheshika is so much associated with Nyaya by tradition that it seems at first sight quite unlikely that it could be supposed to represent an old school of Mimamsa, older than that represented in the Mimamsa sutras. But a closer inspection of the Vaisheshika sutras seems to confirm such a supposition in a very remarkable way. We have seen in the previous section that Caraka quotes a Vaisheshika sutra. Read more »
aphorisms, cognition, demerit, dharma, enumerated, gunas, samskara, sense qualities, sneha, supposition, universality The Vaisheshika sutras begin with the ostensible purpose of explaining virtue (dharma) (I.i. 1) and dharma according to it is that by which prosperity (abhyudaya) and salvation (nihshreyasa) are attained. Then it goes on to say that the validity of the Vedas depends on the fact that it leads us to prosperity and salvation. Then it turns back to the second sutra and says that salvation comes as the result of real knowledge, produced by special excellence of dharma, of the characteristic features of the categories of substance (dravya), quality (guna), class concept (samdanya), particularity (vishesha), and inherence (samavayay) (1). Read more »
dharma, effect karma, guna, karma karma, material cause, odour, sutras, water fire The Nyaya sutras begin with an enumeration of the sixteen subjects, viz. means of right knowledge (pramana), object of right knowledge (prameya), doubt (samshaya), purpose (prayojana), illustrative instances (drishtanta), accepted conclusions (siddhanta), premisses (avayava), argumentation (tarka), ascertainment (nirnaya), debates (vada), disputations (jalpa), destructive criticisms (vitanda), fallacy (hetvabhasa), quibble (chala), refutations (jati), points of opponent’s defeat (nigrahasthana), and hold that by a thorough knowledge of these the highest good (nihshreyasa), is attained. In the second sutra it is said that salvation (apavarga) is attained by the successive disappearance of false knowledge (mithyajnana), defects (dosha), endeavours (pravritti, birth (janma), and ultimately of sorrow (1). Read more »
apta, atman, body senses, chala, dosha, five senses, inference, jalpa, pain sorrow, perception, pleasure pain, right knowledge, self body, sense objects, tarka, testimony When we compare the Nyaya sutras with the Vaisheshika sutras we find that in the former two or three differentstreams of purposes have met, whereas the latter is much more homogeneous. Read more »
authorities, caraka samhita, chala, debates, hindus, jalpa, logical categories, practical art, refutation, sanskrit literature, sutras It is difficult to ascertain definitely the date of the Vaisheshika sutras by Kanada, also called Aulukya the son of Uluka, though there is every reason to suppose it to be pre-Buddhistic. It appears from the Vayu purana that he was born in Prabhasa near Dvaraka, and was the disciple of Somasharma. The time of Prashastapada who wrote a bhashya (commentary) of the Vaisheshika sutras cannot also unfortunately be ascertained. Read more »
commentaries, disciple, dissertation, exposition, gautama, kanada, purana, radha, ravana, shaka, shankara, sutras, udayana, vatsyayana The Nyaya-Vaisheshika having dismissed the doctrine of momentariness took a common-sense view of things, and held that things remain permanent until suitable collocations so arrange themselves that the thing can be destroyed. Thus the jug continues to remain a jug unless or until it is broken to pieces by the stroke of a stick. Things exist not because they can produce an impression on us, or serve my purposes either directly or through knowledge, as the Buddhists suppose, but because existence is one of their characteristics. If I or you or any other perceiver did not exist, the things would continue to exist all the same. Whether they produce any effect on us or on their surrounding environments is immaterial. Existence is the most general characteristic of things, and it is on account of this that things are testified by experience to be existing (1). Read more »
akasha, cosmology, demerit, ear drum, existence, four elements, immaterial, kala, sense of hearing, sense organ, tejas, valid reasons Of the six classes of entities or categories (padartha) we have already given some account of dravya (1). Let us now turn to the others. Of the qualities (guna) the first one called rupa (colour) is that which can be apprehended by the eye alone and not by any other sense. The colours are white, blue, yellow, red, green, brown and variegated (citra). Colours are found only in kshiti, ap and tejas. The colours of ap and tejas are permanent (nitya), but the colour of kshiti changes when heat is applied, and this, Shridhara holds, is due to the fact that heat changes the atomic structure of kshiti (earth) and thus the old constitution of the substance being destroyed, its old colour is also destroyed, and a new one is generated. Rupa is the general name for the specific individual colours. There is the genus rupatva (colourness), and the rupa guna (quality) is that on which rests this genus; rupa is not itself a genus and can be apprehended by the eye. Read more »
akasha, atomic structure, guna, katu, natural taste, nitya, rasa, rupa, tejas, vayu I have pointed out above that Nyaya divided perception into two classes as nirvikalpa (indeterminate) and savikalpa (determinate) according as it is an earlier or a later stage. Vacaspati says, that at the first stage perception reveals an object as a particular; the perception of an orange at this avikalpika or nirvikalpika stage gives us indeed all its colour, form, and also the universal of orangeness associated with it, but it does not reveal it in a subject-predicate relation as when I say “this is an orange.” Read more »
consciously, differentiation, notion, perception, subject and predicate, unification, universals The problem of negation or non-existence (abhava) is of great interest in Indian philosophy. In this section we can describe its nature only from the point of view of perceptibility. Read more »
cognition, existence, indian philosophy, inference, intuition, manam, negation, notion, visual perception Dhurtta Carvakas denied the existence of soul and regarded consciousness and life as products of bodily changes; there were other Carvakas called Sushikshita Carvakas who admitted the existence of soul but thought that it was destroyed at death. Read more »
atman, emotion, existence, inference, metaphysics, notion, perception, pleasures, self consciousness Nyaya seeks to establish the existence of Ishvara on the basis of inference. We know that the Jains, the Samkhya and the Buddhists did not believe in the existence of Ishvara and offered many antitheistic arguments. Nyaya wanted to refute these and prove the existence of Ishvara by an inference of the samanyato-drishta type. The Jains and other atheists held that though things in the world have production and decay, the world as a whole was never produced, and it was never therefore an effect. In contrast to this view the Nyaya holds that the world as a whole is also an effect like any other effect. Read more »
atheists, buddhists, existence, inference, order of the universe We have just said that knowledge arises by itself and that it could not have been generated by sense-contact. If this be so, the diversity of perceptions is however left unexplained. But in face of the Nyaya philosophy explaining all perceptions on the ground of diverse sense-contact the Mimamsa probably could not afford to remain silent on such an important point. Read more »
inference, notion, objective facts, perceptions, senses, validity, virtue The perception of the class (jati) of a percept in relation to other things may thus be regarded in the main as a difference between determinate and indeterminate perceptions. The problems of jati and avayavavayavi (part and whole notion) were the subjects of hot dispute in Indian philosophy. Before entering into discussion about jati, Prabhakara first introduced the problem of avayava (part) and avayavi (whole). Read more »
atoms, consciousness, indian philosophy, jati, material cause, perceptions, true existence Analogy (upamana) is accepted by Mimamsa in a sense which is different from that in which Nyaya took it. The man who has seen a cow (go) goes to the forest and sees a wild ox (gavaya), and apprehends the similarity of the gavaya with the go, and then cognizes the similarity of the go (which is not within the limits of his perception then) with the gavaya. Read more »
analogy, cognition, doubt, existence, perception, psychological analysis, remembrance In addition to the above pramanas Kumarila admits a fifth kind of pramana, viz. anupalabdhi for the perception of the non-existence of a thing. Kumarila argues that the non-existence of a thing (e.g. there is no jug in this room) cannot be perceived by the senses, for there is nothing with which the senses could come into contact in order to perceive the non-existence. Read more »
empty space, existence, inference, negation, negative relation, perception, senses, visible object Mimamsa has to accept the existence of soul, for without it who would perform the Vedic commandments, and what would be the meaning of those Vedic texts which speak of men as performing sacrifices and going to Heaven thereby? The soul is thus regarded as something entirely distinct from the body, the sense organs, and buddhi; it is eternal, omnipresent, and many, one in each body. Prabhakara thinks that it is manifested to us in all cognitions. Indeed he makes this also a proof for the existence of self as a separate entity from the body, for had it not been so, why should we have the notion of self-persistence in all our cognitions–even in those where there is no perception of the body? Read more »
consciousness, existence, going to heaven, pleasure pain, sacrifices, sense organs, true reason, vedic texts From what we have said before it will be easy to see that Mimamsa agrees in the main with Vaisheshika about the existence of the categories of things such as the five elements, the qualities, rupa, rasa, etc. Kumarila’s differences on the points of jati, samavaya, etc. and Prabhakara’s peculiarities have also been mentioned before. On some of these points it appears that Kumarila was influenced by Samkhya thought rather than by Nyaya. Samkhya and Vaisheshika are the only Hindu systems which have tried to construct a physics as a part of their metaphysics; other systems have generally followed them or have differed from them only on minor matters. The physics of Prabhakara and Kumarila have thus but little importance, as they agree in general with the Vaisheshika view. In fact they were justified in not laying any special stress on this part, because for the performance of sacrifices the common-sense view of Nyaya-Vaisheshika about the world was most suitable. Read more »
dharma, five elements, inference, injunctions, rasa, sacrifices, theory of knowledge, valid knowledge, veda Vedanta philosophy is the philosophy which claims to be the exposition of the philosophy taught in the Upanishads and summarized in the Brahma-sutras of Badarayana. The Upanishads form the last part of the Veda literature, and its philosophy is therefore also called sometimes the Uttara-Mimamsa or the Mimamsa (decision) of the later part of the Vedas as distinguished from the Mimamsa of the previous part of the Vedas and the Brahmanas as incorporated in the Purvamimamsa sutras of Jaimini. Read more »
brahmanas, brahma sutras, commentaries, hindu, ramanuja, shankara, upanishads, vedanta philosophy, vedas The main idea of the advaita (non-dualistic) Vedanta philosophy as taught by the Shankara school is this, that the ultimate and absolute truth is the self, which is one, though appearing as many in different individuals. The world also as apart from us the individuals has no reality and has no other truth to show than this self. All other events, mental or physical, are but passing appearances, while the only absolute and unchangeable truth underlying them all is the self. Read more »
absolute truth, advaita, akara, appearances, brahman, cognition, comprehension, duality, macrocosm, microcosm, objective truth, passions, preceptor, sensations, vedanta philosophy, world consciousness The world is said to be false - a mere product of maya. The falsehood of this world-appearance has been explained as involved in the category of the indefinite which is neither sat “is” nor asat “is not.” Here the opposition of the “is” and “is not” is solved by the category of time. The world-appearance is “is not,” since it does not continue to manifest itself in all times, and has its manifestation up to the moment that the right knowledge dawns. It is not therefore “is not” in the sense that a “castle in the air” or a hare’s horn is “is not,” for these are called tuccha, the absolutely non-existent. Read more »
appearance, asat, brahman, castle in the air, conch shell, expression, manifestation, maya, perception, right knowledge Ajnana the cause of all illusions is defined as that which is beginningless, yet positive and removable by knowledge (anadibhavarupatve sati jnananivartyatvam). Though it manifests itself in all ordinary things (veiled by it before they become objects of perception) which have a beginning in time, yet it itself has no beginning, for it is associated with the pure consciousness which is beginningless. Read more »
consciousness, dosha, illusions, imagination, imposition, negation, notion, perception, vedanta Ajnana defined as the indefinite which is neither positive nor negative is also directly experienced by us in such perceptions as “I do not know, or I do not know myself or anybody else,” or “I do not know what you say,” or more particularly “I had been sleeping so long happily and did not know anything.” Read more »
consciousness, entities, i do not know, negation, perception, vedanta This ajnana rests on the pure cit or intelligence. This cit or Brahman is of the nature of pure illumination, but yet it is not opposed to the ajnana or the indefinite. The cit becomes opposed to the ajnana and destroys it only when it is reflected through the mental states (vritti). The ajnana thus rests on the pure cit and not on the cit as associated with such illusory impositions as go to produce the notion of ego “aham” or the individual soul. Read more »
aham, antahkarana, appearance, brahman, ego, illumination, intelligence, jiva, luminosity, madhava, manifestations We have already seen that the indefinite ajnana could be experienced in direct perception and according to Vedanta there are only two categories. The category of the real, the self-luminous Brahman, and the category of the indefinite. The latter has for its ground the world-appearance, and is the principle by which the one unchangeable Brahman is falsely manifested in all the diversity of the manifold world. Read more »
brahman, diversity, existence, infinite reality, infinite variety, maya, objective world, perception, principle, true knowledge, vedanta Pramana is the means that leads to right knowledge. If memory is intended to be excluded from the definition then pramana is to be defined as the means that leads to such right knowledge as has not already been acquired. Right knowledge (prama) in Vedanta is the knowledge of an object which has not been found contradicted (abadhitarthavishayajnanatva). Except when specially expressed otherwise, prama is generally considered as being excludent of memory and applies to previously unacquired (anadhigata) and uncontradicted knowledge (1). Read more »
memory, mental state, perception, previous moments, right knowledge, vedanta We have many times spoken of truth or reality as self-luminous (svayamprakasha). But what does this mean? Vedanta defines it as that which is never the object of a knowing act but is yet immediate and direct with us (avedyatve sati aparoksavyavaharayogyatvam). Self-luminosity thus means the capacity of being ever present in all our acts of consciousness without in any way being an object of consciousness. Read more »
anubhuti, appearance, consciousness, manifestation, self luminosity, vedanta, world experience Jiva or individual means the self in association with the ego and other personal experiences, i.e. phenomenal self, which feels, suffers and is affected by world-experiences. In jiva also three stages are distinguished; thus when during deep sleep the antahkarana is submerged, the self perceives merely the ajnana and the jiva in this state is called prajna or anandamaya. In the dream-state the self is in association with a subtle body and is called taijasa. In the awakened state the self as associated with a subtle and gross body is called vishva. So also the self in its pure state is called Brahman, when associated with maya it is called Ishvara, when associated with the fine subtle element of matter as controlling them, it is called hiranyagarbha; when with the gross elements as the ruler or controller of them it is called virat purusha. Read more »
antahkarana, brahman, caitanya, deep sleep, dream self, dream states, ego, gross body, jiva, maya, personal experiences, purusha, right knowledge, subtle body, world experiences Vedanta says that when a duly qualified man takes to the study of Vedanta and is instructed by the preceptor - “Thou art that (Brahman),” he attains the emancipating knowledge, and the world-appearance becomes for him false and illusory. Read more »
attainment, karma, right knowledge, selfish desires, vedanta, vedas, worldly enjoyments Vedanta is distinctly antagonistic to Nyaya, and most of its powerful dialectic criticism is generally directed against it. Shankara himself had begun it by showing contradictions and inconsistencies in many of the Nyaya conceptions, such as the theory of causation, conception of the atom, the relation of samavaya, the conception of jati, etc (1). Read more »
maya, rajas, sattva, shankara, vedanta, vedas, yoga Yoga in its definition of the structure of the world has many things in common with Sankhya, but it differs indeed from Sankhya in admitting the existence of God. Of course the God’s concept in Yoga, as happened in Nyaya, has passed through different stages: from the primitive one, indifferent presence, God has become, under the influence of theistic tides, an active assistant of liberation. The assimilation with Shiva of the popular religion confers him little by little all the ownerships of Ishvara, the Supreme almighty Being. Read more »
asceticism, existence of god, liberation, moral discipline, right knowledge, sacred texts, sankhya, yoga The yoga mat manufacturer usually gives instructions for the maintenance of your yoga mat. Follow yoga mat manufacturer’s directions if instructions are available. In yoga mat cleaning or washing is of primary importance the type of material your yoga mat is made of. Is it a normal yoga mat made of synthetic materials or one of the newer, all-natural rubber mats, or made of some eco material? Is your yoga mat a padded exercise mat with a foam core? Read more »
exercise mats, foam core, mat manufacturer, natural rubber, rubber mats, synthetic materials, yoga mat, yoga mats The worlds are inhabited by countless grades of beings, ranging from the highest Devas (of whom there are many classes and degrees) to the lowest animal life. The scale of beings runs from the shining manifestations of Spirit to those in which it is so veiled that it would seem almost to have disappeared in its material covering. There is but one Light, one Spirit, whose manifestations are many. Read more »
brahman, gayatri, lakshmi, manifestations, maya, one spirit, purusha, rays of light, rudra, sandhya, sarasvati, supreme mother The human body is Brahma-para, the city of Brahman. Ishvara Himself enters into the universe as jiva. Wherefore the maha-vakya “That thou art” means that the ego (which is regarded as jiva only from the standpoint of an upadhi) (1) is Brahman. Read more »
ananda, bliss, brahman, etheric, jiva, kosha, maya, mental bodies, prana, self conscious, sheats 1. The Standing Exercise.
With your watch in sight try to stand perfectly still (except for breathing and blinking) in front of a mirror for three to five minutes. Make no response to any twitching, tickling, itching, creeping, aching or creaking feelings that may arise. Think “stillness”, not “not-moving-ness”. Read more »
continence, exercise, feelings, hands and feet, intuition, muscles, practise, sensations Exercise 15.
You will by now have discovered that you are able to call up images far more easily than you could before, and that the mind no longer wanders away so wilfully as it used to do. The next step is to make a series of experiments in calling up images bodily and complete before the mind. Read more »
discern, empty space, eyes closed, images, mental vision, repetition, thought stream, transformations The Yogi Philosophy teaches of the existence of a Universal Creative Will, emanating from the Absolute–infilled with the power of the Absolute and acting under established natural laws, which performs the active work of creation in the world, similar to that performed by “Cudsworth’s Plastic Nature,” just mentioned. This Creative Will is not Schopenhauer’s Will-to-Live. It is not a Thing-in-itself, but a vehicle or instrument of the Absolute. It is an emanation of the mind of the Absolute–a manifestation in action of its Will–a mental product rather than a physical, and, of course, saturated with the life-energy of its projector. Read more »
causes of motion, Creative Will, Desire to manifest, Life Energy, manifestations of energy, progressing evolutionary effort, Yogi Philosophy Those who will read our next lesson and thus gain an idea of the sublime conception of the Absolute held by the Yogi teachers may shudder at the presumption of those mortals who dare to think of the Absolute as possessing “attributes” and “qualities” like unto the meanest of things in this his emanated Universe. But even these spiritual infants are doing well–that is, they are beginning to think, and when man begins to think and question, he begins to progress. It is not the fact of these people’s immature ideas that has caused these remarks on our part, but rather their tendency to set up their puny conceptions as the absolute truth, and then insisting upon forcing these views upon the outer world of men, whom they consider “poor ignorant heathen.” Read more »
Absolute,