I have pointed out above that Nyaya divided perception into two classes as nirvikalpa (indeterminate) and savikalpa (determinate) according as it is an earlier or a later stage. Vacaspati says, that at the first stage perception reveals an object as a particular; the perception of an orange at this avikalpika or nirvikalpika stage gives us indeed all its colour, form, and also the universal of orangeness associated with it, but it does not reveal it in a subject-predicate relation as when I say “this is an orange.”

The avikalpika stage thus reveals the universal associated with the particular, but as there is no association of name at this stage, the universal and the particular are taken in one sweep and not as terms of relation as subject and predicate or substance and attribute (jatyadisvarupavagahi na tu jatyadinam mitho visheshanavisheshyabhavavagahiti yavat) (1).

He thinks that such a stage, when the object is only seen but not associated with name or a subject-predicate relation, can be distinguished in perception not only in the case of infants or dumb persons that do not know the names of things, but also in the case of all ordinary persons, for the association of the names and relations could be distinguished as occurring at a succeeding stage (2). Shridhara, in explaining the Vaisheshika view, seems to be largely in agreement with the above view of Vacaspati. Thus Shridhara says that in the nirvikalpa stage not only the universals were perceived but the differences as well. But as at this stage there is no memory of other things, there is no manifest differentiation and unification such as can only result by comparison. But the differences and the universals as they are in the thing are perceived, only they are not consciously ordered as “different from this” or “similar to this,” which can only take place at the savikalpa stage (3).

Vacaspati did not bring in the question of comparison with others, but had only spoken of the determinate notion of the thing in definite subject-predicate relation in association with names. The later Nyaya writers however, following Gangesha, hold an altogether different opinion on the subject. With them nirvikalpa knowledge means the knowledge of mere predication without any association with the subject or the thing to which the predicate refers. But such a knowledge is never testified by experience. The nirvikalpa stage is thus a logical stage in the development of perceptual cognition and not a psychological stage. They would not like to dispense with it for they think that it is impossible to have the knowledge of a thing as qualified by a predicate or a quality, without previously knowing the quality or the predicate (vishishtavaishishtyajnanam prati hi visheshanatavacchedakaprakaram jnanam karanam) (4).

So, before any determinate knowledge such as “I see a cow,” “this is a cow” or “a cow” can arise it must be preceded by an indeterminate stage presenting only the indeterminate, unrelated, predicative quality as nirvikalpa, unconnected with universality or any other relations (jatyadiyojanarahitam vaishishtyanavagahi nishprakarakam nirvikalpakam) (5). But this stage is never psychologically experienced (atindriya) and it is only a logical necessity arising out of their synthetic conception of a proposition as being the relationing of a predicate with a subject. Thus Vishvanatha says in his Siddhantamuktavali, “the cognition which does not involve relationing cannot be perceptual for the perception is of the form ‘I know the jug’; here the knowledge is related to the self, the knower, the jug again is related to knowledge and the definite content of jugness is related to the jug. It is this content which forms the predicative quality (visheshanatavacchedaka) of the predicate ‘jug’ which is related to knowledge. We cannot therefore have the knowledge of the jug without having the knowledge of the predicative quality, the content (6).” But in order that the knowledge of the jug could be rendered possible, there must be a stage at which the universal or the pure predication should be known and this is the nirvikalpa stage, the admission of which though not testified by experience is after all logically indispensably necessary. In the proposition “It is a cow,” the cow is an universal, and this must be intuited directly before it could be related to the particular with which it is associated.

But both the old and the new schools of Nyaya and Vaisheshika admitted the validity of the savikalpa perception which the Buddhists denied. Things are not of the nature of momentary particulars, but they are endowed with class-characters or universals and thus our knowledge of universals as revealed by the perception of objects is not erroneous and is directly produced by objects. The Buddhists hold that the error of savikalpa perception consists in the attribution of jati (universal), guna (quality), kriya (action), nama (name), and dravya (substance) to things (7).

The universal and that of which the universal is predicated are not different but are the same identical entity. Thus the predication of an universal in the savikalpa perception involves the false creation of a difference where there was none. So also the quality is not different from the substance and to speak of a thing as qualified is thus an error similar to the former. The same remark applies to action, for motion is not something different from that which moves. But name is completely different from the thing and yet the name and the thing are identified, and again the percept “man with a stick” is regarded as if it was a single thing or substance, though “man” and “stick” are altogether different and there is no unity between them. Now as regards the first three objections it is a question of the difference of the Nyaya ontological position with that of the Buddhists, for we know that Nyaya and Vaisheshika believe jati, guna and kriya to be different from substance and therefore the predicating of them of substance as different categories related to it at the determinate stage of perception cannot be regarded as erroneous.

As to the fourth objection Vacaspati replies that the memory of the name of the thing roused by its sight cannot make the perception erroneous. The fact that memory operates cannot in any way vitiate perception. The fact that name is not associated until the second stage through the joint action of memory is easily explained, for the operation of memory was necessary in order to bring about the association. But so long as it is borne in mind that the name is not identical with the thing but is only associated with it as being the same as was previously acquired, there cannot be any objection to the association of the name. But the Buddhists further object that there is no reason why one should identify a thing seen at the present moment as being that which was seen before, for this identity is never the object of visual perception. To this Vacaspati says that through the help of memory or past impressions (samskara) this can be considered as being directly the object of perception, for whatever may be the concomitant causes when the main cause of sense-contact is present, this perception of identity should be regarded as an effect of it.

But the Buddhists still emphasize the point that an object of past experience refers to a past time and place and is not experienced now and cannot therefore be identified with an object which is experienced at the present moment. It has to be admitted that Vacaspati’s answer is not very satisfactory for it leads ultimately to the testimony of direct perception which was challenged by the Buddhists (8). It is easy to see that early Nyaya-Vaisheshika could not dismiss the savikalpa perception as invalid for it was the same as the nirvikalpa and differed from it only in this, that a name was associated with the thing of perception at this stage. As it admits a gradual development of perception as the progressive effects of causal operations continued through the contacts of the mind with the self and the object under the influence of various intellectual (e.g. memory) and physical (e.g. light rays) concomitant causes, it does not, like Vedanta, require that right perception should only give knowledge which was not previously acquired. The variation as well as production of knowledge in the soul depends upon the variety of causal collocations.

1. Tatparyatika, p. 81, also ibid. p. 91, “prathamamalocito’rthah samanyavisheshavan.”
2. Ibid. p.84, “tasmadvyutpannasyapi namadheyasmaranayapurvameshitavyo vinaiva namadheyamarthapratyayah.”
3. Nyayakandali,p. 189 ff., “atah savikalpakamicchata nirvikalpakamapyeshitavyam, tacca na samanyamatram grihnati bhedasyapi pratibhasanat napi svalakshanamatram samanyakarasyapi samvedanat vyaktyantaradarshane pratisandhanacca, kintu samanyam visheshancobhayamapi grihnati yadi paramidam samanyamayam visheshah ityevam vivicya na pratyeti vastvantaranusandhanavirahat, pindantaranuvrittigrahanaddhi samanyam vivicyate, vyavrittigrahanadvisheshoyamiti vivekah.”
4. Tattvacintamani p. 812.
5. Ibid. p. 809.
6. Siddhantamuktavali on Bhashapariccheda karika, 58.
7. Nyayamanjari, pp. 93-100, “Panca caite kalpana bhavanti jatikalpana, gunakalpana, kriyakalpana, namakalpana dravyakalpana ceti, tashca kvacidabhede’pi bhedakalpanat kvacicca bhede’pyabhedakalpanat kalpana ucyante.” See Dharmakirtti’s theory of Perception, pp. 151-4. See also pp. 409-410 of this book.
8. Tatparyatika, pp. 88-95.

consciously, differentiation, notion, perception, subject and predicate, unification, universals