The Vaisheshika is so much associated with Nyaya by tradition that it seems at first sight quite unlikely that it could be supposed to represent an old school of Mimamsa, older than that represented in the Mimamsa sutras. But a closer inspection of the Vaisheshika sutras seems to confirm such a supposition in a very remarkable way. We have seen in the previous section that Caraka quotes a Vaisheshika sutra.

An examination of Caraka’s Sutrasthana (I.35-38) leaves us convinced that the writer of the verses had some compendium of Vaisheshika such as that of the Bhashapariccheda before him. Caraka sutra or karika (I.i. 36) says that the gunas are those which have been enumerated such as heaviness, etc., cognition, and those which begin with the guna “para” (universality) and end with “prayatna” (effort) together with the sense-qualities (sartha). It seems that this is a reference to some well-known enumeration. But this enumeration is not to be found in the Vaisheshika sutra (I.i. 6) which leaves out the six gunas, heaviness (gurutva), liquidity (dravatva), oiliness(sneha), elasticity (samskara), merit (dharma) and demerit (adharma); in one part of the sutra the enumeration begins with “para” (universality) and ends in “prayatna,” but buddhi (cognition) comes within the enumeration beginning from para and ending in prayatna, whereas in Caraka buddhi does not form part of the list and is separately enumerated. This leads me to suppose that Caraka’s sutra was written at a time when the six gunas left out in the Vaisheshika enumeration had come to be counted as gunas, and compendiums had been made in which these were enumerated. Bhashapariccheda (a later Vaisheshika compendium), is a compilation from some very old karikas which are referred to by Vishvanatha as being collected from “atisamkshiptacirantanoktibhih”– (from very ancient aphorisms (1)]); Caraka’s definition of samanya and vishesha shows that they had not then been counted as separate categories as in later Nyaya-Vaisheshika doctrines; but though slightly different it is quite in keeping with the sort of definition one finds in the Vaisheshika sutra that samanya (generality) and vi’sesha are relative to each other (2).

Caraka’s sutras were therefore probably written at a time when the Vaisheshika doctrines were undergoing changes, and well-known compendiums were beginning to be written on them.

The Vaisheshika sutras seem to be ignorant of the Buddhist doctrines. In their discussions on the existence of soul, there is no reference to any view as to non-existence of soul, but the argument turned on the point as to whether the self is to be an object of inference or revealed to us by our notion of “I.” There is also no other reference to any other systems except to some Mimamsa doctrines and occasionally to Samkhya. There is no reason to suppose that the Mimamsa doctrines referred to allude to the Mimamsa sutras of Jaimini. The manner in which the nature of inference has been treated shows that the Nyaya phraseology of “purvavat” and “sheshavat” was not known. Vaisheshika sutras in more than one place refer to time as the ultimate cause (3).

We know that the Shvetashvatara Upanishad refers to those who regard time as the cause of all things, but in none of the systems that we have can we trace any upholding of this ancient view (4). These considerations as well as the general style of the work and the methods of discussion lead me to think that these sutras are probably the oldest that we have and in all probability are pre-Buddhistic.

The Vaisheshika sutra begins with the statement that its object is to explain virtue, “dharma” This is we know the manifest duty of Mimamsa and we know that unlike any other system Jaimini begins his Mimamsa sutras by defining “dharma”. This at first seems irrelevant to the main purpose of Vaisheshika, viz, the description of the nature of padartha (4). He then defines dharma as that which gives prosperity and ultimate good (nihsreyasa) and says that the Veda must be regarded as valid, since it can dictate this. He ends his book with the remarks that those injunctions (of Vedic deeds) which are performed for ordinary human motives bestow prosperity even though their efficacy is not known to us through our ordinary experience, and in this matter the Veda must be regarded as the authority which dictates those acts (5).

The fact that the Vaisheshika begins with a promise to describe dharma and after describing the nature of substances, qualities and actions and also the adrishta (unknown virtue) due to dharma (merit accruing from the performance of Vedic deeds) by which many of our unexplained experiences may be explained, ends his book by saying that those Vedic works which are not seen to produce any direct effect, will produce prosperity through adrsta, shows that Kanada’s method of explaining dharma has been by showing that physical phenomena involving substances, qualities, and actions can only be explained up to a certain extent while a good number cannot be explained at all except on the assumption of adrishta (unseen virtue) produced by dharma.

The description of the categories of substance is not irrelevant, but is the means of proving that our ordinary experience of these cannot explain many facts which are only to be explained on the supposition of adrishta proceeding out of the performance of Vedic deeds. In V.i. 15 the movement of needles towards magnets, in V. ii. 7 the circulation of water in plant bodies, V. ii. 13 and IV. ii. 7 the upward motion of fire, the side motion of air, the combining movement of atoms (by which all combinations have taken place), and the original movement of the mind are said to be due to adrishta. In V. ii. 17 the movement of the soul after death, its taking hold of other bodies, the assimilation of food and drink and other kinds of contact (the movement and development of the foetus as enumerated in Upaskara) are said to be due to adrishta. Salvation (moksa) is said to be produced by the annihilation of adrishta leading to the annihilation of all contacts and non production of rebirths Vaishesika marks the distinction between the drsta (experienced) and the adrishta. All the categories that he describes are founded on drsta (experience) and those unexplained by known experience are due to adrishta These are the acts on which depend all life-process of animals and plants, the continuation of atoms or the construction of the worlds, natural motion of fire and air, death and rebirth (VI. ii. 15) and even the physical phenomena by which our fortunes are affected in some way or other (V. ii. 2), in fact all with which we are vitally interested in philosophy. Kanada’s philosophy gives only some facts of experience regarding substances, qualities and actions, leaving all the graver issues of metaphysics to adrishta But what leads to adrishta? In answer to this, Kanada does not speak of good or bad or virtuous or sinful deeds, but of Vedic works, such as holy ablutions (snana), fasting, holy student life (brahmacarya), remaining at the house of the teacher (gurukulavasa), retired forest life (vanaprastha), sacrifice (yajna), gifts (dana), certain kinds of sacrificial sprinkling and rules of performing sacrificial works according to the prescribed time of the stars, the prescribed hymns (mantras) (VI. ii. 2).

He described what is pure and what is impure food, pure food being that which is sacrificially purified (VI. ii. 5) the contrary being impure, and he says that the taking of pure food leads to prosperity through adrishta. He also described how feelings of attachment to things are also generated by adrishta. Throughout almost the whole of VI. i Kanada is busy in showing the special conditions of making gifts and receiving them. A reference to our chapter on Mimamsa will show that the later Mimamsa writers agreed with the Nyaya-Vais`eshika doctrines in most of their views regarding substance, qualities, etc. Some of the main points in which Mimamsa differs from Nyaya-Vais`eshika are (1) self-validity of the Vedas, (2) the eternality of the Vedas, (3) disbelief in any creator or god, (4) eternality of sound (shabda), (5) (according to Kumarila) direct perception of self in the notion of the ego. Of these the first and the second points do not form any subject of discussion in the Vaisheshika. But as no Ishvara is mentioned, and as all adrishta depends upon the authority of the Vedas, we may assume that Vaisheshika had no dispute with Mimamsa.

The fact that there is no reference to any dissension is probably due to the fact that really none had taken place at the time of the Vais`eshika sutras. It is probable that Kanada believed that the Vedas were written by some persons superior to us (II. i. 18, VI. i. 1-2). But the fact that there is no reference to any conflict with Mimamsa suggests that the doctrine that the Vedas were never written by anyone was formulated at a later period, whereas in the days of the Vaisheshika sutras, the view was probably what is represented in the Vaisheshika sutras. As there is no reference to Is`vara and as adrishta proceeding out of the performance of actions in accordance with Vedic injunctions is made the cause of all atomic movements, we can very well assume that Vaisheshika was as atheistic or non-theistic as the later Mimamsa philosophers. As regards the eternality of sound, which in later days was one of the main points of quarrel between the Nyaya-Vaisheshika and the Mimamsa, we find that in II. ii. 25-32, Kanada gives reasons in favour of the non-eternality of sound, but after that from II. ii. 33 till the end of the chapter he closes the argument in favour of the eternality of sound, which is the distinctive Mimamsa view as we know from the later Mimamsa writers (6). Next comes the question of the proof of the existence of self. The traditional Nyaya view is that the self is supposed to exist because it must be inferred as the seat of the qualities of pleasure, pain, cognition, etc. Traditionally this is regarded as the Vaisheshika view as well. But in Vaisheshika III. ii. 4 the existence of soul is first inferred by reason of its activity and the existence of pleasure, pain, etc., in III. ii. 6-7 this inference is challenged by saying that we do not perceive that the activity, etc. belongs to the soul and not to the body and so no certainty can be arrived at by inference, and in III. ii. 8 it is suggested that therefore the existence of soul is to be accepted on the authority of the scriptures (agama). To this the final Vaisheshika conclusion is given that we can directly perceive the self in our feeling as “I” (aham), and we have therefore not to depend on the scriptures for the proof of the existence of the self, and thus the inference of the existence of the self is only an additional proof of what we already find in perception as “I” (aham) (III. ii. 10-18, also IX. i. 11).

These considerations lead me to think that the Vaisheshika represented a school of Mimamsa thought which supplemented a metaphysics to strengthen the grounds of the Vedas.

1: Professor Vanamali Vedantatirtha’s article in J.A.S.B., 1908.
2: Caraka (I.i. 33) says that samanya is that which produces unity and vishesha is that which separates. V.S. II. ii. 7. Samanya and vishesha depend upon our mode of thinking (as united or as separate).
3: Vaisheshika sutra (II. ii. 9 and V. ii. 26).]
4: S’vetas’vatara I.i.2
5: I remember a verse quoted in an old commentary of the Kalapa Vyakarana, in which it is said that the description of the six categories by Kanada in his Vaisheshika sutras, after having proposed to describe the nature of dharma, is as irrelevant as to proceed towards the sea while intending to go to the mountain Himavat (Himalaya).

“Dnarmam vyakhyatukamasya shatpadarthopavarnanam Himavadgantukamasya sagaragamanopamam.”

6: The sutra “Tadvacanad amnayasya pramanyam (I.i.3 and X.ii.9) has been explained by Upaskara as meaning “The Veda being the word of Ishvara (God) must be regarded as valid,” but since there is no mention of Ishvara anywhere in the text this is simply reading the later Nyaya ideas into the Vaisheshika. Sutra X.ii.8 is only a repetition of VI.ii.1.]
[Footnote 1: The last two concluding sutras II. ii. 36 and 37 are in my opinion wrongly interpreted by Shankara Mishra in his Upaskara (II. ii. 36 by adding an “api” to the sutra and thereby changing the issue, and II. ii. 37 by misreading the phonetic combination “samkhyabhava” as samkhya and bhava instead of samkhya and abhava, which in my opinion is the right combination here) in favour of the non-eternality of sound as we find in the later Nyaya Vaisheshika view.

aphorisms, cognition, demerit, dharma, enumerated, gunas, samskara, sense qualities, sneha, supposition, universality