When we compare the Nyaya sutras with the Vaisheshika sutras we find that in the former two or three differentstreams of purposes have met, whereas the latter is much more homogeneous.

The large amount of materials relating to debates treated as a practical art for defeating an opponent would lead one to suppose that it was probably originally compiled from some other existing treatises which were used by Hindus and Buddhists alike for rendering themselves fit to hold their own in debates with their opponents (1).

This assumption is justified when we compare the futilities (jati) quibbles (chala), etc., relating to disputations as found in the Nyaya sutra with those that are found in the medical work of Caraka (78 A.D.), III. viii. There are no other works in early Sanskrit literature, excepting the Nyaya sutra and Caraka-samhita which have treated of these matters. Caraka’s description of some of the categories (e.g. drishtanta, prayojana, pratijna and vitanda) follows very closely the definitions given of those in the Nyaya sutras. There are others such as the definitions of jalpa, chala, nigrahasthana, etc., where the definitions of two authorities differ more. There are some other logical categories mentioned in Caraka (e.g. pratishthapana, jijnasa, vyavasaya, vakyadosha, vakyaprashamsa, upalambha, parihara, abhyanujna, etc.) which are not found in the Nyaya sutra (2).

Again, the various types of futilities (jati) and points of opponent’s refutation (nigrahasthana) mentioned in the Nyaya sutra are not found in Caraka. There are some terms which are found in slightly variant forms in the two works, e.g. aupamya in Caraka, upamana in Nyaya sutra, arthapatti in Nyaya sutra and arthaprapti in Caraka. Caraka does not seem to know anything about the Nyaya work on this subject, and it is plain that the treatment of these terms of disputations in the Caraka is much simpler and less technical than what we find in the Nyaya sutras. If we leave out the varieties of jati and nigrahasthana of the fifth book, there is on the whole a great agreement between the treatment of Caraka and that of the Nyaya sutras. It seems therefore in a high degree probable that both Caraka and the Nyaya sutras were indebted for their treatment of these terms of disputation to some other earlier work. Of these, Caraka’s compilation was earlier, whereas the compilation of the Nyaya sutras represents a later work when a hotter atmosphere of disputations had necessitated the use of more technical terms which are embodied in this work, but which were not contained in the earlier work. It does not seem therefore that this part of the work could have been earlier than the second century A.D.

Another stream flowing through the Nyaya sutras is that of a polemic against the doctrines which could be attributed to the Sautrantika Buddhists, the Vijnanavada Buddhists, the nihilists, the Samkhya, the Carvaka, and some other unknown schools of thought to which we find no further allusion elsewhere. The Vaisheshika sutras as we have already seen had argued only against the Mimamsa, and ultimately agreed with them on most points. The dispute with Mimamsa in the Nyaya sutras is the same as in the Vaisheshika over the question of the doctrine of the eternality of sound. The question of the self-validity of knowledge (svatah pramanyavada)and the akhyati doctrine of illusion of the Mimamsists, which form the two chief points of discussion between later Mimamsa and later Nyaya, are never alluded to in the Nyaya sutras. The advocacy of Yoga methods (Nyaya sutras, IV.ii.38-42 and 46) seems also to be an alien element; these are not found in Vaisheshika and are not in keeping with the general tendency of the Nyaya sutras, and the Japanese tradition that Mirok added them later on as Mahamahopadhyaya Haraprasada Shastri has pointed out (3) is not improbable.

The Vaisheshika sutras, III.i.18 and III.ii.1, describe perceptional knowledge as produced by the close proximity of the self (atman), the senses and the objects of sense, and they also adhere to the doctrine, that colour can only be perceived under special conditions of samskara (conglomeration etc.). The reason for inferring the existence of manas from the non-simultaneity (ayaugapadya) of knowledge and efforts is almost the same with Vaisheshika as with Nyaya. The Nyaya sutras give a more technical definition of perception, but do not bring in the questions of samskara or udbhutarupavattva which Vaisheshika does. On the question of inference Nyaya gives three classifications as purvavat, sheshavat and samanyatodrishta, but no definition.

The Vaisheshika sutras do not know of these classifications, and give only particular types or instances of inference (V.S. III. i. 7-17, IX. ii. 1-2, 4-5). Inference is said to be made when a thing is in contact with another, or when it is in a relation of inherence in it, or when it inheres in a third thing; one kind of effect may lead to the inference of another kind of effect, and so on. These are but mere collections of specific instances of inference without reaching a general theory. The doctrine of vyapti (concomitance of hetu (reason) and sadhya (probandum)) which became so important in later Nyaya has never been properly formulated either in the Nyaya sutras or in the Vaisheshika. Vaisheshika sutra, III. i. 24, no doubt assumes the knowledge of concomitance between hetu and sadhya (prasiddhipurvakatvat apadeshasya), but the technical vyapti is not known, and the connotation of the term prasiddhipurvakatva of Vaisheshika seems to be more loose than the term vyapti as we know it in the later Nyaya. The Vaisheshika sutras do not count scriptures (shabda) as a separate pramana, but they tacitly admit the great validity of the Vedas. With Nyaya sutras shabda as a pramana applies not only to the Vedas, but to the testimony of any trustworthy person, and Vatsyayana says that trustworthy persons may be of three kinds rishi, arya and mleccha (foreigners). Upamana which is regarded as a means of right cognition in Nyaya is not even referred to in the Vaisheshika sutras.

The Nyaya sutras know of other pramanas, such as arthapatti, sambhava and aitihya, but include them within the pramanas admitted by them, but the Vaisheshika sutras do not seem to know them at all (4). The Vaisheshika sutras believe in the perception of negation (abhava) through the perception of the locus to which such negation refers (IX. i. 1-10). The Nyaya sutras (II. ii. 1, 2, 7-12) consider that abhava as non-existence or negation can be perceived; when one asks another to “bring the clothes which are not marked,” he finds that marks are absent in some clothes and brings them; so it is argued that absence or non-existence can be directly perceived (5).

Though there is thus an agreement between the Nyaya and the Vaisheshika sutras about the acceptance of abhava as being due to perception, yet their method of handling the matter is different. The Nyaya sutras say nothing about the categories of dravya, guna, karma, vishesha and samavaya which form the main subjects of Vaisheshka discussions (6).

The Nyaya sutras take much pains to prove the materiality of the senses. But this question does not seem to have been important with Vaisheshika. The slight reference to this question in VIII. ii. 5-6 can hardly be regarded as sufficient. The Vaisheshika sutras do not mention the name of “Ishvara,” whereas the Nyaya sutras try to prove his existence on eschatological grounds. The reasons given in support of the existence of self in the Nyaya sutras are mainly on the ground of the unity of sense-cognitions and the phenomenon of recognition, whereas the Vaisesika lays its main emphasis on self-consciousness as a fact of knowledge. Both the Nyaya and the Vaisheshika sutras admit the existence of atoms, but all the details of the doctrine of atomic structure in later Nyaya-Vaisheshika are absent there. The Vai’seshika calls salvation nihshreyasa or moksha and the Nyaya apavarga. Moksha with Vaisheshika is the permanent cessation of connection with body; the apavarga with Nyaya is cessation of pain (7).

In later times the main points of difference between the Vaisheshika and Nyaya are said to lie with regard to theory of the notion of number, changes of colour in the molecules by heat, etc. Thus the former admitted a special procedure of the mind by which cognitions of number arose in the mind (e.g. at the first moment there is the sense contact with an object, then the notion of oneness, then from a sense of relativeness–apekshabuddhi–notion of two, then a notion of two-ness, and then the notion of two things); again, the doctrine of pilupaka (changes of qualities by heat are produced in atoms and not in molecules as Nyaya held) was held by Vaisheshika, which the Naiyayikas did not admit (8).

But as the Nyaya sutras are silent on these points, it is not possible to say that such were really the differences between early Nyaya and early Vaiseshika. These differences may be said to hold between the later interpreters of Vaisheshika and the later interpreters of Nyaya. The Vaisheshika as we find it in the commentary of Prashastapada (probably sixth century A.D.), and the Nyaya from the time of Udyotakara have come to be treated as almost the same system with slight variations only. I have therefore preferred to treat them together. The main presentation of the Nyaya-Vaisheshika philosophy in this chapter is that which is found from the sixth century onwards.

1: A reference to the Suvarnaprabhasa sutra shows that the Buddhist missionaries used to get certain preparations for improving their voice in order to be able to argue with force, and they took to the worship of Sarasvati (goddess of learning), who they supposed would help them in bringing readily before their mind all the information and ideas of which they stood so much in need at the time of debates.
2: Like Vaisheshika, Caraka does not know the threefold division of inference (anumana) as purvavat, sheshavat and samanyatodrishta.
3: J.A.S.B. 1905.
4: The only old authority which knows these pramanas is Caraka. But he also gives an interpretation of sambhava which is different from Nyaya and calls arthapatti arthaprapti (Caraka III. viii.).
5: The details of this example are taken from Vatsyayana’s commentary.
6: The Nyaya sutra no doubt incidentally gives a definition of jati as “samanaprasavatmika jatih” (II. ii. 71).
7: Professor Vanamali Vedantatirtha quotes a passage from Samkshepashankarajaya, XVI. 68-69 in J.A.S.B., 1905, and another passage from a Nyaya writer Bhasarvajna, pp. 39-41, in J.A.S.B., 1914, to show that the old Naiyayikas considered that there was an element of happiness (sukha) in the state of mukti (salvation) which the Vaisheshikas denied. No evidence in support of this opinion is found in the Nyaya or the Vaisheshika sutras, unless the cessation of pain with Nyaya is interpreted as meaning the resence of some sort of bliss or happiness.
8: See Madhava’s Sarvadarshanasamgraha-Aulukyadarshana.

authorities, caraka samhita, chala, debates, hindus, jalpa, logical categories, practical art, refutation, sanskrit literature, sutras