The third pramana, which is admitted by Nyaya and not by Vaisheshika, is upamana, and consists in associating a thing unknown before with its name by virtue of its similarity with some other known thing. Thus a man of the city who has never seen a wild ox (gavaya) goes to the forest, asks a forester - “what is gavaya?” and the forester replies - “oh, you do not know it, it is just like a cow”; after hearing this from the forester he travels on, and on seeing a gavaya and finding it to be similar to a cow he forms the opinion that this is a gavaya. This knowing an hitherto unknown thing by virtue of its similarity to a known thing is called upamana. Read more »

cow, inference, observation, perception, realists, right knowledge, testimony, validity, vedas, virtue, visual sense

The problem of negation or non-existence (abhava) is of great interest in Indian philosophy. In this section we can describe its nature only from the point of view of perceptibility. Read more »

cognition, existence, indian philosophy, inference, intuition, manam, negation, notion, visual perception

It is probable that the Nyaya philosophy arose in an atmosphere of continued disputes and debates; as a consequence of this we find here many terms related to debates which we do not notice in any other system of Indian philosophy. These are tarka, nirnaya, vada, jalpa, vitanda, hetvabhasa, chala, jati and nigrahasthana. Read more »

atman, destructive criticism, indian philosophy, intangible, jalpa, real nature, tarka, tautology, vada

Dhurtta Carvakas denied the existence of soul and regarded consciousness and life as products of bodily changes; there were other Carvakas called Sushikshita Carvakas who admitted the existence of soul but thought that it was destroyed at death. Read more »

atman, emotion, existence, inference, metaphysics, notion, perception, pleasures, self consciousness

Nyaya seeks to establish the existence of Ishvara on the basis of inference. We know that the Jains, the Samkhya and the Buddhists did not believe in the existence of Ishvara and offered many antitheistic arguments. Nyaya wanted to refute these and prove the existence of Ishvara by an inference of the samanyato-drishta type. The Jains and other atheists held that though things in the world have production and decay, the world as a whole was never produced, and it was never therefore an effect. In contrast to this view the Nyaya holds that the world as a whole is also an effect like any other effect. Read more »

atheists, buddhists, existence, inference, order of the universe

The Nyaya-Vaisheshika philosophy looked at experience from a purely common sense point of view and did not work with any such monistic tendency that the ultimate conceptions of our common sense experience should be considered as coming out of an original universal (e.g. prakriti of the Samkhya). Space, time, the four elements, soul, etc. convey the impression that they are substantive entities or substances. What is perceived of the material things as qualities such as colour, taste, etc. is regarded as so many entities which have distinct and separate existence but which manifest themselves in connection with the substances. Read more »

causation, common sense, four elements, jnana, material objects, monistic, sense experience, sense knowledge, substances

It is difficult to say how the sacrificial system of worship grew in India in the Brahmanas. This system once set up gradually began to develop into a net-work of elaborate rituals, the details of which were probably taken note of by the priests. As some generations passed and the sacrifices spread over larger tracts of India and grew up into more and more elaborate details, the old rules and regulations began to be collected probably as tradition had it, and this it seems gave rise to the smriti literature. Read more »

brahmanas, commentaries, enquiry, ganganatha jha, india, literature discussions, sacrifices, sacrificial rituals, sutras

The doctrine of the self-validity of knowledge (svatah-pramanya) forms the cornerstone on which the whole structure of the Mimamsa philosophy is based. Validity means the certitude of truth. The Mimamsa philosophy asserts that all knowledge excepting the action of remembering (smriti) or memory is valid in itself, for it itself certifies its own truth, and neither depends on any other extraneous condition nor on any other knowledge for its validity. Read more »

infer, objective truth, perception, philosophy, representation, revelation, validity, visual contact

We have just said that knowledge arises by itself and that it could not have been generated by sense-contact. If this be so, the diversity of perceptions is however left unexplained. But in face of the Nyaya philosophy explaining all perceptions on the ground of diverse sense-contact the Mimamsa probably could not afford to remain silent on such an important point. Read more »

inference, notion, objective facts, perceptions, senses, validity, virtue

There are two kinds of perception in two stages, the first stage is called nirvikalpa (indeterminate) and the second savikalpa (determinate). The nirvikalpa perception of a thing is its perception at the first moment of the association of the senses and their objects. Read more »

buddhist view, cognition, consciousness, determinate, genus, individuality, percept, perception, senses

The perception of the class (jati) of a percept in relation to other things may thus be regarded in the main as a difference between determinate and indeterminate perceptions. The problems of jati and avayavavayavi (part and whole notion) were the subjects of hot dispute in Indian philosophy. Before entering into discussion about jati, Prabhakara first introduced the problem of avayava (part) and avayavi (whole). Read more »

atoms, consciousness, indian philosophy, jati, material cause, perceptions, true existence

All knowledge involves the knower, the known object, and the knowledge at the same identical moment. All knowledge whether perceptual, inferential or of any other kind must necessarily reveal the self or the knower directly. Thus as in all knowledge the self is directly and immediately perceived, all knowledge may be regarded as perception from the point of view of self. Read more »

appearance, cognition, deep sleep, dharma, dreams, inferential, perception, perceptual, reference to, remembrance

The question however arises that if all apprehensions are valid, how are we to account for illusory perceptions which cannot be regarded as valid? The problem of illusory perception and its psychology is a very favourite topic of discussion in Indian philosophy. Read more »

conch shell, illusion, illusory appearance, indian philosophy, perception, piece of silver, psychology

Shabara says that when a certain fixed or permanent relation has been known to exist between two things, we can have the idea of one thing when the other one is perceived, and this kind of knowledge is called inference. Kumarila on the basis of this tries to show that inference is only possible when we notice that in a large number of cases two things (e.g. smoke and fire) subsist together in a third thing (e.g. kitchen, etc.) in some independent relation, i.e. when their coexistence does not depend upon any other eliminable condition or factor. Read more »

cause and effect, existence, infer, inference, rohini, smoke and fire

Analogy (upamana) is accepted by Mimamsa in a sense which is different from that in which Nyaya took it. The man who has seen a cow (go) goes to the forest and sees a wild ox (gavaya), and apprehends the similarity of the gavaya with the go, and then cognizes the similarity of the go (which is not within the limits of his perception then) with the gavaya. Read more »

analogy, cognition, doubt, existence, perception, psychological analysis, remembrance

Shabda or word is regarded as a separate means of proof by most of the recognized Indian systems of thought excepting the Jaina, Buddhist, Carvaka and Vaisheshika. A discussion on this topic however has but little philosophical value and I have therefore omitted to give any attention to it in connection with the Nyaya, and the Samkhya-Yoga systems. The validity and authority of the Vedas were acknowledged by all Hindu writers and they had wordy battles over it with the Buddhists who denied it. Read more »

carvaka, philosophical value, sutras, vedas

In addition to the above pramanas Kumarila admits a fifth kind of pramana, viz. anupalabdhi for the perception of the non-existence of a thing. Kumarila argues that the non-existence of a thing (e.g. there is no jug in this room) cannot be perceived by the senses, for there is nothing with which the senses could come into contact in order to perceive the non-existence. Read more »

empty space, existence, inference, negation, negative relation, perception, senses, visible object

Mimamsa has to accept the existence of soul, for without it who would perform the Vedic commandments, and what would be the meaning of those Vedic texts which speak of men as performing sacrifices and going to Heaven thereby? The soul is thus regarded as something entirely distinct from the body, the sense organs, and buddhi; it is eternal, omnipresent, and many, one in each body. Prabhakara thinks that it is manifested to us in all cognitions. Indeed he makes this also a proof for the existence of self as a separate entity from the body, for had it not been so, why should we have the notion of self-persistence in all our cognitions–even in those where there is no perception of the body? Read more »

consciousness, existence, going to heaven, pleasure pain, sacrifices, sense organs, true reason, vedic texts

From what we have said before it will be easy to see that Mimamsa agrees in the main with Vaisheshika about the existence of the categories of things such as the five elements, the qualities, rupa, rasa, etc. Kumarila’s differences on the points of jati, samavaya, etc. and Prabhakara’s peculiarities have also been mentioned before. On some of these points it appears that Kumarila was influenced by Samkhya thought rather than by Nyaya. Samkhya and Vaisheshika are the only Hindu systems which have tried to construct a physics as a part of their metaphysics; other systems have generally followed them or have differed from them only on minor matters. The physics of Prabhakara and Kumarila have thus but little importance, as they agree in general with the Vaisheshika view. In fact they were justified in not laying any special stress on this part, because for the performance of sacrifices the common-sense view of Nyaya-Vaisheshika about the world was most suitable. Read more »

dharma, five elements, inference, injunctions, rasa, sacrifices, theory of knowledge, valid knowledge, veda

Comprehension of the philosophical Issues more essential than the Dialectic of controversy. Read more »

attainment, epistemological, perceptions, philosophical issues, psychological experience, right knowledge, sanskrit, theory of knowledge

It is difficult to ascertain the time when the Brahma-sutras were written, but since they contain a refutation of almost all the other Indian systems, even of the Shunyavada Buddhism (of course according to Shankara’s interpretation), they cannot have been written very early. I think it may not be far from the truth in supposing that they were written some time in the second century B.C. Read more »

brahma sutras, govinda, madhava, mandukya upanishad, monistic, shankara, upanishads

It is useless I think to attempt to bring out the meaning of the Vedanta thought as contained in the Brahma-sutras without making any reference to the commentary of Shankara or any other commentator. There is reason to believe that the Brahma-sutras were first commented upon by some Vaishnava writers who held some form of modified dualism. Read more »

brahma sutras, dualism, nagarjuna, philosophy, prajnaparamita, shankara, upanishads, vaishnava, vedanta

Gaudapada’s work is divided into four chapters: (1) Agama (scripture), (2) Vaitathya (unreality), (3) Advaita (unity), (4) Alatashanti (the extinction of the burning coal). The first chapter is more in the way of explaining the Mandukya Upanishad by virtue of which the entire work is known as Mandukyakarika. The second, third, and fourth chapters are the constructive parts of Gaudapada’s work, not particularly connected with the Mandukya Upanishad. Read more »

advaita, ananda, atma, deep sleep, dream state, extinction, mandukya upanishad, oneness, prana, shivam, theories of creation

Vedanta philosophy is the philosophy which claims to be the exposition of the philosophy taught in the Upanishads and summarized in the Brahma-sutras of Badarayana. The Upanishads form the last part of the Veda literature, and its philosophy is therefore also called sometimes the Uttara-Mimamsa or the Mimamsa (decision) of the later part of the Vedas as distinguished from the Mimamsa of the previous part of the Vedas and the Brahmanas as incorporated in the Purvamimamsa sutras of Jaimini. Read more »

brahmanas, brahma sutras, commentaries, hindu, ramanuja, shankara, upanishads, vedanta philosophy, vedas

The Mimamsists held that everything that is said in the Vedas is to be interpreted as requiring us to perform particular kinds of action, or to desist from doing certain other kinds. This would mean that the Upanishads being a part of the Veda should also be interpreted as containing injunctions for the performance of certain kinds of actions. The description of Brahman in the Upanishads does not therefore represent a simple statement of the nature of Brahman, but it implies that the Brahman should be meditated upon as possessing the particular nature described there, i.e. Brahman should be meditated upon as being an entity which possesses a nature which is identical with our self; such a procedure would then lead to beneficial results to the man who so meditates. Shankara could not agree to such a view. For his main point was that the Upanishads revealed the highest truth as the Brahman. No meditation or worship or action of any kind was required; but one reached absolute wisdom and emancipation when the truth dawned on him that the Brahman or self was the ultimate reality. The teachings of the other parts of the Vedas, the karmakanda (those dealing with the injunctions relating to the performance of duties and actions), were intended for inferior types of aspirants, whereas the teachings of the Upanishads, the jnanakanda (those which declare the nature of ultimate truth and reality), were intended only for superior aspirants who had transcended the limits of sacrificial duties and actions, and who had no desire for any earthly blessing or for any heavenly joy. Read more »

bhagavadgita, brahman, heavenly joy, meditation, sacrifices, shankara, truth and reality, upanishads, veda, vedas

The main idea of the advaita (non-dualistic) Vedanta philosophy as taught by the Shankara school is this, that the ultimate and absolute truth is the self, which is one, though appearing as many in different individuals. The world also as apart from us the individuals has no reality and has no other truth to show than this self. All other events, mental or physical, are but passing appearances, while the only absolute and unchangeable truth underlying them all is the self. Read more »

absolute truth, advaita, akara, appearances, brahman, cognition, comprehension, duality, macrocosm, microcosm, objective truth, passions, preceptor, sensations, vedanta philosophy, world consciousness

The world is said to be false - a mere product of maya. The falsehood of this world-appearance has been explained as involved in the category of the indefinite which is neither sat “is” nor asat “is not.” Here the opposition of the “is” and “is not” is solved by the category of time. The world-appearance is “is not,” since it does not continue to manifest itself in all times, and has its manifestation up to the moment that the right knowledge dawns. It is not therefore “is not” in the sense that a “castle in the air” or a hare’s horn is “is not,” for these are called tuccha, the absolutely non-existent. Read more »

appearance, asat, brahman, castle in the air, conch shell, expression, manifestation, maya, perception, right knowledge

Yoga is more and more being used by those who are having a difficulty in adjusting the timetable and balancing their work, business activities and personal life. A stressful working environment and a chaotic life schedule have a significant impact on the personal lives of the modern day workers and managers and so they are turning to yoga to bring about a peace of their mind, a more fit body and to adopt a perfect work-life balance. Mind-body health, which derives from Indian yoga philosophies and practices, improves physical and emotional well-being, and has implications for workplace performance. Read more »

cardiac risk factors, chaotic life, exercise regimes, fit body, hormone production, indian yoga, mind body health, stress hormone, weight trainers, yoga exercises

The world-appearance is not however so illusory as the perception of silver in the conch-shell, for the latter type of worldly illusions is called pratibhasika, as they are contradicted by other later experiences, whereas the illusion of world-appearance is never contradicted in this worldly stage and is thus called vyavaharika (from vyavahara, practice, i.e. that on which is based all our practical movements). Read more »

appearance, brahman, consciousness, illusions, perception, right knowledge, sattva, true reality, vedanta

Ajnana the cause of all illusions is defined as that which is beginningless, yet positive and removable by knowledge (anadibhavarupatve sati jnananivartyatvam). Though it manifests itself in all ordinary things (veiled by it before they become objects of perception) which have a beginning in time, yet it itself has no beginning, for it is associated with the pure consciousness which is beginningless. Read more »

consciousness, dosha, illusions, imagination, imposition, negation, notion, perception, vedanta

Ajnana defined as the indefinite which is neither positive nor negative is also directly experienced by us in such perceptions as “I do not know, or I do not know myself or anybody else,” or “I do not know what you say,” or more particularly “I had been sleeping so long happily and did not know anything.” Read more »

consciousness, entities, i do not know, negation, perception, vedanta

This ajnana rests on the pure cit or intelligence. This cit or Brahman is of the nature of pure illumination, but yet it is not opposed to the ajnana or the indefinite. The cit becomes opposed to the ajnana and destroys it only when it is reflected through the mental states (vritti). The ajnana thus rests on the pure cit and not on the cit as associated with such illusory impositions as go to produce the notion of ego “aham” or the individual soul. Read more »

aham, antahkarana, appearance, brahman, ego, illumination, intelligence, jiva, luminosity, madhava, manifestations

We have already seen that the indefinite ajnana could be experienced in direct perception and according to Vedanta there are only two categories. The category of the real, the self-luminous Brahman, and the category of the indefinite. The latter has for its ground the world-appearance, and is the principle by which the one unchangeable Brahman is falsely manifested in all the diversity of the manifold world. Read more »

brahman, diversity, existence, infinite reality, infinite variety, maya, objective world, perception, principle, true knowledge, vedanta

The Vedanta philosophy looked at the constantly changing phenomena of the world-appearance and sought to discover the root whence proceeded the endless series of events and effects. The theory that effects were altogether new productions caused by the invariable unconditional and immediately preceding antecedents, as well as the theory that it was the cause which evolved and by its transformations produced the effect, are considered insufficient to explain the problem which the Vedanta had before it. Read more »

cause and effect, definition of cause and effect, manifestation, phenomena, transformations, vedanta philosophy

Pramana is the means that leads to right knowledge. If memory is intended to be excluded from the definition then pramana is to be defined as the means that leads to such right knowledge as has not already been acquired. Right knowledge (prama) in Vedanta is the knowledge of an object which has not been found contradicted (abadhitarthavishayajnanatva). Except when specially expressed otherwise, prama is generally considered as being excludent of memory and applies to previously unacquired (anadhigata) and uncontradicted knowledge (1). Read more »

memory, mental state, perception, previous moments, right knowledge, vedanta

We have many times spoken of truth or reality as self-luminous (svayamprakasha). But what does this mean? Vedanta defines it as that which is never the object of a knowing act but is yet immediate and direct with us (avedyatve sati aparoksavyavaharayogyatvam). Self-luminosity thus means the capacity of being ever present in all our acts of consciousness without in any way being an object of consciousness. Read more »

anubhuti, appearance, consciousness, manifestation, self luminosity, vedanta, world experience

Jiva or individual means the self in association with the ego and other personal experiences, i.e. phenomenal self, which feels, suffers and is affected by world-experiences. In jiva also three stages are distinguished; thus when during deep sleep the antahkarana is submerged, the self perceives merely the ajnana and the jiva in this state is called prajna or anandamaya. In the dream-state the self is in association with a subtle body and is called taijasa. In the awakened state the self as associated with a subtle and gross body is called vishva. So also the self in its pure state is called Brahman, when associated with maya it is called Ishvara, when associated with the fine subtle element of matter as controlling them, it is called hiranyagarbha; when with the gross elements as the ruler or controller of them it is called virat purusha. Read more »

antahkarana, brahman, caitanya, deep sleep, dream self, dream states, ego, gross body, jiva, maya, personal experiences, purusha, right knowledge, subtle body, world experiences

The subject can be conceived in three forms: firstly as the atman, the one highest reality, secondly as jiva or the atman as limited by its psychosis, when the psychosis is not differentiated from the atman, but atman is regarded as identical with the psychosis thus appearing as a living and knowing being, as jivasakshi or perceiving consciousness, or the aspect in which the jiva comprehends, knows, or experiences; thirdly the antahkarana psychosis or mind which is an inner centre or bundle of avidya manifestations, just as the outer world objects are exterior centres of avidya phenomena or objective entities. The antahkarana is not only the avidya capable of supplying all forms to our present experiences, but it also contains all the tendencies and modes of past impressions of experience in this life or in past lives. The antahkarana is always turning the various avidya modes of it into the jivasakshi (jiva in its aspect as illuminating mental states), and these are also immediately manifested, made known, and transformed into experience. Read more »

antahkarana, atman, impressions, jiva, jnana, manifestation, objective world, states of consciousness

The inner experiences of pleasure and pain also are generated by a false identification of antahkarana transformations as pleasure or pain with the self, by virtue of which are generated the perceptions, “I am happy,” or “I am sorry.” Read more »

antahkarana, false identification, inference, inner experiences, manifestation, perception, pleasure and pain, vedanta

We have already seen that the Mimamsists had asserted that all knowledge was true simply because it was knowledge (yatharthah sarve vivadaspadibhutah pratyayah pratyayatvat). Even illusions were explained by them as being non-perception of the distinction between the thing perceived (e.g. the conch-shell), and the thing remembered (e.g. silver). Read more »

illusions, perception, presence, vedanta